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 Disability policy has always been deeply immersed in questions relating to the 
relationships between disability and poverty.  These efforts began as early as the Poor 
Laws of eighteenth century England.  They were further enhanced by the rise of the 
modern welfare state, and culminated twenty years ago with the enactment of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act that symbolizes the turn from welfare to rights.  In this 
Article, I argue that it is time to reexamine the nexus between disability and poverty and 
attend to their co-constitutive relationships.  I suggest a reconstructive reading of 
disability allowances as a locus of the transition from an understanding of disability and 
poverty as two overlapping categories to an emphasis on the constitutive relationships 
between them—a transition from a heavily civil rights-based discourse to a social 
welfare-oriented discussion that internalizes the actual needs of disabled people who live 
in poverty.  These issues have generally gone unnoticed in the literature, rendering the 
understanding of the politics that surround disability allowances incomplete.   
 Focusing on the construction and negation of disability allowances, this Article 
identifies and traces the roots of a fundamental tension that underlies disability politics 
with regard to disability allowances: are cash benefits an archaic and outdated form of 
assistance to disabled people, or are they still a relevant mode of response to their 
systematic marginalization and exclusion?  Based on a field study of the Israeli disability 
community, the Article shows that while disability rights advocates tend to reject 
disability allowances as fundamentally wrong and to support the transformation of 
society's social structures, welfare activists tend to view disability allowances as a 
response to a pressing necessity, an expression of social responsibility, and a means to 
provide economic security for disabled people.  The Article employs a disability legal 
studies framework to analyze the study’s findings, attending primarily to questions of 
power and difference, and offering a framework that considers both perspectives as two 
authentic voices that express genuine concerns.  At the same time, the analysis maintains 
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that both approaches lack a more complex understanding of the relationships between 
disability and poverty, within which the meanings of disability allowances are negotiated.  
It concludes with a call to re-conceptualize disability allowance, as a form of 
compensation that redresses disabled people—individually and collectively—for society's 
past and present continuing practices of exclusion and discrimination.  The struggles of 
disabled people over rights and allowances become a fascinating site from which to draw 
the critical lessons that disability activism has to offer to social theory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We are given poor and miserable allowances so that we stay alive and be 
silent.  They say: ―Nobody can tell us that we are an immoral society, 
because you are alive.‖ But what kind of life are we talking about here? I 
am struggling so that a disabled person can be part of society, and this 
starts with money and food.  I want the disabled to live in dignity, to be 




¶1 Disability policy has always been deeply immersed in questions relating to the 
relationships between disability and poverty.  Ever since the Poor Laws
2
 of eighteenth-
century England, there has been a constant effort to separate disability from poverty.  
This effort has been enhanced with the rise of the modern welfare state during the 
nineteenth century, and has culminated in the twenty years that have passed since the 
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
3
  It is time to reexamine the 
nexus between disability and poverty and attend to their co-constitutive relationships.   
¶2 I suggest a reconstructive reading of disability allowances as a locus of transition 
from an understanding of disability and poverty as two overlapping categories to an 
emphasis on the constitutive relationships between them—a transition from a heavily 
civil rights-based discourse to a social welfare-oriented discussion that internalizes the 
actual needs of disabled people who live in poverty.  The attempt to separate disability 
from poverty has generally gone unnoticed in the literature, rendering the understanding 
of the politics that surround disability allowances incomplete. 
¶3 Focusing on the construction and negation of disability allowances, this Article 
identifies and traces the roots of a fundamental tension that underlies disability politics 
with regard to disability allowances: Are cash benefits an archaic and outdated form of 
assistance to disabled people, or are they still a relevant mode of response to their 
                                               
1 Hagar Yanai, Things I Learned While Sitting, HA‘ARETZ, Jan. 11, 2002, at 24–28 (Hebrew) (translated by 
author).  Yoav Kraim is the spokesperson of an Israeli organization called Campaign for Handicapped 
Persons in Israel. 
2 DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 29–55 (1984).  
3 Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-33 (1990).  The ADA is civil rights 
legislation that prohibits the discrimination of disabled people in five major areas: employment, state and 
local government programs and activities, accessibility of public entities, accessibility of private facilities 
that provide public services, and accessibility of communication devices.   
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systematic marginalization and exclusion?  Do they serve as a manifestation of ableism 
or a way to fight it?
4
  
¶4 This Article draws on an in-depth field study of the Israeli disability community‘s 
struggle for economic security and human dignity, focusing on two long sit-in strike 
campaigns of disabled people in Israel that took place in 1999 and 2001.
5
  Both 
campaigns were mainly concerned with social welfare benefits for disabled people, 
particularly cash benefits.  The field study revealed two dominant approaches within the 
disability community toward disability allowances.  While the entire disability 
community is interested in breaking the well-established link between disability and 
poverty, its members do not share a vision of the way to do it.  Welfare activists tend to 
view disability allowances as an important service that addresses the most pressing needs 
of poor disabled people who cannot wait until the rights revolution becomes a reality.
6
  
Disability rights advocates, however, tend to reject disability allowances as 
fundamentally wrong, because it reinforces the marginal status of disabled people in 
society as a nonproductive group.
7
  Instead, they support a total transformation of 
society‘s structures and institutions.
8
  In the case of the sit-in strikes, they argued that by 
emphasizing disability allowances and by using images of disabled people as miserable, 




¶5 This Article analyzes these conflicts through the lens of disability legal studies.  
Disability legal studies is a theoretical framework for the study of law and disability that 
incorporates lessons drawn from disabilities studies in the humanities and social 
sciences.
10
  The primary tenet of disability studies is that disability is a socially 
constructed category rather than an inherent, objective, or fixed trait that resides within 
the disabled person.
11
  Disability studies focuses on the complex ways that economic 
relations, cultural meanings, social practices, and institutional settings participate in the 
disablement of persons.  It analyzes the forms and manifestations of the disability power 
system in various social practices and institutions.  It also examines the portrayal of 
                                               
4 Ableism is the power structure that renders disabled people inferior to and dominated by nondisabled 
people, thereby serving as a justification for the discrimination and exclusion of disabled people. Disability 
activists and scholars seek to abolish ableism by exposing its hidden forms of operation and the social and 
cultural conditions that support it.  See SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 9 
(1998); Paul Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability, 
in DISABILITY STUDIES: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE (Len Barton & Mike Oliver eds., 1997). 
5 See discussion infra Part IV.  
6 See discussion infra Part V.A. & Part V.B.vi.  
7 See discussion infra Part V.B.iii.  
8 See discussion infra Part V.B.  
9 See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
10 Sagit Mor, Between Charity, Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis of Privilege and 
Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63 (2006) [hereinafter Between Charity, 
Welfare and Warfare]; Sagit Mor, Imagining the Law: The Construction of Disability in the Domains of 
Rights and Welfare—The Case of Israeli Disability Policy (Nov. 2005) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, New 
York University School of Law), available at http://works.bepress.com/sagitmor/5/. 
11  The following is an introductory list of seminal works in disability studies: LINTON, supra note 4; 
LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY (1995); MICHAEL J. 
OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990); SUSAN WENDELL, THE 
REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY (1996). 
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disabled people as inferior, useless, abnormal, and as a burden to society.
12
  
Methodologically, the discipline requires listening to voices and experiences of disabled 
people and incorporating them into its findings and critiques.
13
  Disability legal studies 
applies these underlying principles to the study of law and focuses on critique of legal 
doctrines, institutions, concepts, and practices, as it examines the role of law in the social 
and cultural construction of disability.
14
 
¶6 This Article applies a disability legal studies approach and calls for a 
re-conceptualization of the meaning and function of disability allowances, as well as the 
further investigation of the relationships between disability, poverty, and rights.  It 
suggests that disability rights advocates have disregarded the urgent needs of disabled 
people because they have failed to create a model that can guarantee economic security 
(for example through social welfare or social security mechanisms).  It will also argue 
that welfare activists have neglected to develop a structural and comprehensive critique 
of welfare (of disability allowances, in particular).   
¶7 This Article will introduce a different view of disability allowances, a view that 
rests on three complementary premises.  The first premise stresses the unavoidable nature 
of disability allowances and the need to acknowledge the possibility that the disability 
rights vision might never be fulfilled.  The second premise substantiates the view of 
disability allowances as a group-based form of compensation that redresses disabled 
people not for their disabilities but rather for society's ongoing practices of exclusion and 
discrimination.  The third premise examines what services disability allowances are 
intended to provide and suggests two possible components: disability-related expenses 
and general poverty-related costs.     
¶8 The contribution of this study is not limited to disability politics or to the Israeli 
context.  Rather, the suggested critique presents a challenge that has implications for the 
politics of poverty and rights more generally.  Its lessons can contribute to the 
understanding of the tensions that underlie struggles over disability, ranging from public 
assistance to single parents to food stamps and housing vouchers.  It can also enhance the 
possibility of coalition building among various groups around these seemingly sectarian 
issues.   
¶9 Part II of this Article discusses the relationship between disability and poverty, 
emphasizing their contingencies and mutual relations.  Part III provides a short 
introduction to the history of disability allowances in Israel.  Part IV tells the story of the 
disability allowance protests in Israel and the criticism they faced.  Part V delves into the 
details of the two perspectives on disability allowances that this fieldwork identified: the 
social welfare perspective and the disability rights view.  Part VI explores the conflict 
between the two perspectives.  It offers a critique of the disability rights discourse and 
suggests that poverty is a sustained problem and that disability allowances should be 
                                               
12  See, e.g., Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory, 14 
NWSA J. 1, 4–5 (2002); Martin Pernick, Defining the Defective: Eugenics, Aesthetics, and Mass Culture in 
Early 20th-Century America, in THE BODY AND PHYSICAL DIFFERENCE: DISCOURSE OF DISABILITY 89 
(David T. Mitchell & Sharon Snyder eds., 1997). 
13 See, e.g., LINTON, supra note 4; Geof Mercer, Emancipatory Disability Research, in DISABILITY STUDIES 
TODAY 228 (Colin Barnes, Mike Oliver & Len Barton eds., 2002). 
14 Between Charity, Welfare and Warfare, supra note 10, at 67–82; Arlene S. Kanter. The Law: What's 
Disability Studies Got to Do With It or An Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 102 (forthcoming 2011). 
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acknowledged as an undesirable yet unavoidable necessity for disabled people who live 
in poverty.  Part VII proposes possible alternatives for reconstructing disability 
allowances.  It discusses what services these allowances should cover, and suggests that 
they should be understood as an obligation of society towards disabled people for 
maintaining its able-istic structure and for not removing all barriers that prevent them 
from full participation in society.  Part VIII examines the possibilities for coalition 
building between disability advocates and welfare activists, especially with regard to the 
basic needs component of the newly constructed disability allowances. 
II. DISABILITY AND POVERTY: CHALLENGING RELATIONSHIPS  
Not all who are poor are physically handicapped; not all who are 
handicapped are poor.  But the two conditions—poverty and disability—
are historically so intermeshed as to be often indistinguishable.  
    
Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W. Matson (1966)
15
 
¶10 Understanding the historical, political, and socioeconomic context of disability 
allowances requires a close examination of the relationship between disability and 
poverty.  In this Part, I identify and describe two general approaches to the relationship 
between the two.  The overlap approach views disability and poverty as two distinct 
concepts that refer to two distinct groups of people, though there are points of overlap 
and correlation between them.  The constitutive approach holds that both disability and 
poverty are a socially constructed, fluid, and contingent phenomena, which historically 
have been co-constitutive, intensely intertwined, and mutually dependent upon one 
another.  Both perspectives are important, and together they enrich our understanding of 
the role that disability allowances play in disabled people‘s lives.  Nevertheless, the latter 
view allows for the development of a more complex understanding of poverty and 
disability and, consequently, for the evolution of a more critical approach to disability 
allowances.   
A. The Overlap Between Disability and Poverty  
¶11 The overlap approach is widely accepted among scholars, activists, and 
policymakers because it highlights both the disproportionate poverty of disabled people 
and the disproportionate disability rates amongst people who live in poverty.
16
  Under the 
overlap approach, disability and poverty are two separate concerns that require different 
policies and generate distinct struggles.  This approach tends to take these categories ―as 
                                               
15 Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV 809, 809 
(1966). 
16 Rebecca Yeo & Karen Moore, Including Disabled People in Poverty Reduction Work: Nothing About 
Us, Without Us, 31 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 571 (2003); Dan Atkins & Christie Guisti, The Confluence of 
Poverty and Disability, in THE REALITIES OF POVERTY IN DELAWARE 2003–2004 (2004), available at 
http://www.housingforall.org/rop0304%20poverty%20and%20disability.pdf; see also Jeanine Braithwaite 
& Daniel Mont, Disability and Poverty: A Survey of World Bank Poverty Assessments and Implications 
(2008).   
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they are‖ without questioning their shared histories or the power dynamics within which 
they are jointly situated.  
¶12 The overlap approach is most clearly supported by those who perceive disability as 
an immutable trait and who view disabled people as inherently unable to work, without 
considering the social aspects that shape disability.  But it could also be supported by 
those who believe that disability is socially constructed and that social and environmental 
barriers prevent disabled people from working, who often aspire explicitly to liberate 
disabled people from being destined to poverty, and implicitly to separate disability and 
poverty.
17
  The significance of this approach is that it draws attention to the important 
link between disability and poverty, according to which disabled people are more likely 
to become poor and poor people are more likely to become disabled.  The shortcoming of 
this view is that it tends to perceive this link as a result of mere correlation, an 
unwarranted connection between having an impairment and becoming poor.   
¶13 There are, of course, many disabled people who are employed and earn their own 
living.  Yet a considerable number among them are still poor because of low wages, 
limited working hours, and high payments for disability-related costs.
18
  Some disabled 
people may also support themselves using public or private funds that provide them with 
the required financial support (such as family resources, public assistance, social security 
benefits, and charities of all kinds); however, statistics suggest that the unemployment 
rates among the disabled remain high, even after the introduction and enactment of 
disability rights laws, which prohibit disability-based discrimination in the workplace.
19
  
The challenge of breaking the link between disability and poverty lies at the heart of 
recent welfare reforms, and it informs contemporary disability rights laws.   
¶14 Disability is also an outcome of being poor.20  An insufficient standard of living 
can create health risks that lead to illness and impairment: malnutrition, unsanitary 
conditions, and outdated infrastructures, all of which are more prevalent in poor areas, are 
recognized causes of disability.  In addition, access to healthcare, rehabilitation, and 
vocational services are principal factors determining the degree of disability remaining 
after exposure to a disabling event.
21
  Acknowledging the overlap between disability and 
poverty lays the foundation for the constitutive approach, which considers the poverty-
                                               
17 See infra notes 149–150 and accompanying text. 
18 Martha Russell & Ravi Malhotra, The Political Economy of Disablement: Advances and Contradictions, 
38 SOCIALIST REG.: A WORLD OF CONTRADICTIONS 211 (L. Panitch & C. Leys eds., 2002); Asghar Zaidi & 
Tania Burchardt, Comparing Incomes When Needs Differ: Equivalization for the Extra Costs of Disability 
in the U.K.,  51 REV. OF INCOME AND WEALTH 89 (2005); Yeo & Moore, supra note 16.  
19  See DINA FELDMAN & ELIYAHU BEN-MOSHE, PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN ISRAEL 2007: A 
COMPARATIVE REPORT—A MULTIYEAR PERSPECTIVE AND AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (2007) 
(Hebrew) (translated by author); ELIYAHU BEN-MOSHE, LIORA ROFMAN & ISRAEL HABER, PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES IN ISRAEL 2009: DISABILITY AND INTEGRATION IN SOCIAL LIFE IN ISRAEL—A COMPARATIVE 
MULTIYEAR PERSPECTIVE (2009) (Hebrew) (translated by author), for such statistics in Israel.  See also 
DISABILITY WORK AND CASH BENEFITS (Jerry Meshaw et al. eds., 1996) (providing a United States 
perspective).  
20 Atkins & Guisti, supra note 16; Yeo & Moore, supra note 16; Katherine Seelman & Sean Sweeney, The 
Changing Universe of Disability, 21 AM. REHABILITATION 2 (1995). 
21 GARY L.  ALBRECHT, THE DISABILITY BUSINESS 13–14 (1992); see also WENDELL, supra note 11, at 36–
37 (describing the social factors that construct disability); Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, 
Poor, and Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB.  POL‘Y 69 (1991) (arguing that race was the greatest differentiating factor in communities with 
hazardous waste facilities).   
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disability connection to be a product of social construction rather than of chance and 
individual circumstances. 
B. The Constitutive Relations Between Disability and Poverty  
¶15 The constitutive approach is critical of the boundaries and definitions of both 
disability and poverty; it is therefore more compatible with a disability legal studies 
analysis, which questions the use of all categories and situates them within a historical 
and political context.  According to this view, disability and poverty are closely 
connected and co-constitutive, as shown by the history of the modern welfare state,
22
 as 
well as by recent accounts of disability rights struggles.  In fact, the boundaries between 
disability and poverty have historically been a matter of constant negotiation, subject to 
persistent attempts to associate and disassociate between the two categories, to draw them 
together and to set them apart.  Drawing the boundaries was fundamental to capitalism‘s 
definition of the labor force and to welfare‘s definitions of desert and need.
23
  As 
Deborah Stone, a social scientist who studies the history of disability policy, has shown, 
the structure of many modern welfare states is rooted in the line drawn between the 
disabled and the nondisabled as a means of distinguishing between those who are exempt 
from work and those who are required to earn their own income.
24
  
¶16 The English Poor Laws are an example of an historical attempt to distinguish the 
deserving from the undeserving ―idle‖ poor, between those who were eligible for charity 
and protection of the state and those who were expected to work.
25
  Similarly, debates in 
the Unites States over social security programs involve questions about the fluid 
boundaries between the two categories.  Deciding the components of the definition was a 
major issue, particularly since an emphasis on medical versus socioeconomic constraints 
could broaden or narrow the scope of the population covered by the program.
26
  The link 
between the employability of disabled people and larger social processes was most 
vividly exposed during World War II, when disabled people suddenly enjoyed higher 
rates of employment in the United States.
27
  As Harlan Hahn puts it, disabled people 




                                               
22 Yeo & Moore, supra note 16; Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and 
the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (2001). 
23 NEIL GILBERT & PAUL TERRELL, DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY (2d ed. 1986).    
24 STONE, supra note 2, at 3–12. 
25 Id. at 29–55. 
26 In the end, there were three major types of programs: a work injury program that was enacted in 1935, a 
disabled workers program from 1956 that covered all contributing workers who paid their social insurance 
fees (SSD), and a general public assistance program that covered disabled people who could not enjoy 
social insurance programs.  Id. at 68–89; Williams H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare 
System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1448–86 (1986); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil 
Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993). 
27  Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptable Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, in THE 
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 172 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997).   
28 Id.; see also Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 
U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 897 (―Insofar as disability is related to work, its existence depends not only on a 
person‘s physical ability to do a job but also on the availability of work.‖).  
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¶17 The impact of the disability/poverty dyad is also apparent in today‘s varying 
benefits programs for disabled people.  Disability benefits programs are usually based on 
one or two of the following principles: need, insurance, and desert.
29
  General welfare 
programs for disabled people, such as public assistance-based programs, usually follow 
the legacy of the Poor Laws.  They are based on the welfare-related principle of need.  In 
these programs, the determination of whether one is sufficiently disabled depends on 
one‘s socioeconomic situation, as defined by the means test, the program‘s primary 
eligibility mechanism.
30
  Desert and insurance-based programs determine whether one is 
sufficiently disabled to receive benefits without considering the person‘s socioeconomic 
situation.
31
  Instead, they examine whether the individual in question had insurance (like 
social insurance) or whether the circumstances of her disablement fall under the relevant 
law‘s well-bounded definition of eligible persons (such as military or work-related 
injury).  Desert-based programs are the most generous programs, typically designed to 
benefit specific groups of disabled persons who were injured in circumstances in which 
the state had an interest and which represent principles to which society is committed.
32
 
¶18 Nevertheless, I contend that even desert- and insurance-based programs cannot 
avoid the tension between disability and poverty.  While these programs do not explicitly 
consider their beneficiaries‘ level of poverty, they typically provide them with benefits 
that are much more generous than those provided by public assistance programs, 
consequently allowing beneficiaries to lead a more dignified life.  As noted above, these 
programs were motivated not only by a concern for who potential beneficiaries were, but 
also by who they were not.
33
  The scheme of disability benefits was based on the view 
that there are groups of disabled persons that deserve to live with economic dignity: 
Unlike ―ordinary‖ disabled people, meritorious groups should live neither in poverty, nor 
on the edge of the poverty line.
34
  Implicit in this scheme of benefits is the notion that the 
beneficiaries of the general disability program are not deserving of economic dignity and 
security.  Although a distinction is drawn between the disabled and the general poor, it is 
a marginal, fragile line.  Indeed, society supports the disabled, allowing them to live, but 
their survival is craftily maintained below the poverty line.  Consequently, for privileged 
groups of disabled people, becoming poor is in fact the ultimate mark of becoming 
―truly‖ disabled.  I therefore suggest that unlike public assistance programs for disabled 
people, programs for work-related injuries and for disabled veterans can be understood as 
sincere attempts to break the link between disability and poverty.  On the other hand, 
these programs also create an artificial separation between the deserving and the 
                                               
29 John Gal, The Perils of Compensation in Social Welfare Policy: Disability Policy in Israel, 75 SOCIAL 
SERVICE REV. 225 (2001).  In this article, Gal provides a detailed account of the relationships between three 
allocative principles (desert, insurance and need) and their application to the various welfare programs for 
people with disabilities in Israel.  Id.; see also GILBERT & TERRELL, supra note 23 (discussing desert, 
insurance and need). 
30 See infra note 112–113 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.  
33 Between Charity, Welfare and Warfare, supra note 10, at 130–34. 
34 Id. 
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¶19 More recently, disability rights advocates have introduced a different vision 
regarding the future of disabled people in society—a future that is liberated from poverty 
and even from social welfare.  The primary mechanisms to accomplish that vision were 
laws against employment discrimination and rules concerning accommodations in the 
workplace.  In one provocative article, Samuel Bagenstos, a prominent disability law 
scholar, argues that the ADA was marketed to and perceived by the public as a welfare 
reform, since legislators intended the Act to make disabled people more productive and 
self-reliant and to take them off welfare rolls and put them on payrolls.
36
  The goal of 
disability rights activists involved in the legislation, on the other hand, has been much 
broader: These activists hoped to transform society and to alter the image of disabled 
people from dependent, inferior, and useless, to independent, equal, and productive 
members of society.  In the aftermath of this new legislation, however, high 
unemployment rates persisted, and the number of disability benefit recipients grew 
larger.
37
  This suggests that non-discrimination provisions were insufficient to overcome 
the long history of exclusion and oppression of disabled people. 
¶20 This Article will demonstrate that the strategic shift from welfare to rights has 
resulted in a neglect of disability allowances.  Based on the case study of disability 
protests in Israel, I argue that the underlying reason for such neglect was an implicit 
aspiration to break away from the historical link between disability and poverty. 
III. A HISTORY OF DISABILITY POLICY IN ISRAEL 
A. The Differentiated Structure of Disability Allowances  
¶21 Israel has developed three major models of disability allowances, and these models 
include eighteen separate programs for different groups of disabled people.
38
  The first of 
these models, the Invalids Law of 1949, was the first welfare law in Israel and was based 
on benefits for disabled veterans.
39
  The second of these models was based on the Work 
Injury Program of the National Insurance Law, which was passed in 1954.
40
  The general 
population of disabled people who needed financial support received public assistance 
                                               
35
 See id.; Gal, supra note 29; John Gal & Michael Bar, The Needed and the Needy: The Policy Legacies of 
Benefits for Disabled War Veterans in Israel, 29 J. SOC. POL‘Y 577 (2000). 
36 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
921, 930–52 (2003) (arguing that the ADA was warmly received by policymakers because it was 
understood as welfare reform that would reduce the number of welfare recipients, and that this view is 
problematic because accommodations are not sufficient to overcome the exclusion of disabled people from 
the labor force). 
37 DISABILITY WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 19; GROWTH IN DISABILITY BENEFITS (Kalman Rupp 
& David Stapleton eds., 1998). 
38 See Between Charity, Welfare and Warfare, supra note 10; Gal, supra note 29; URIEL PROCACCIA & 
ARIE L. MILLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED IN ISRAEL: BASIC ISSUES 12 (1974) (Hebrew) (translated by 
author), for detailed reviews of these models. 
39  Invalids (Pension and Rehabilitation) Law, 5709–1949, 3 LSI 119 (1949) 1959 (lsr.).  In 1959, a 
consolidated version was published.  Invalids (Pension and Rehabilitation) Law [Consolidated Version], 
5719–1959, 13 LSI  315 (1958–59) (lsr.) [hereinafter the Invalids Law]. 
40 National Insurance Law, 5714–1954, 8 LSI 4 (1953–1954). 




 until 1974, when the third of these models, the Disability Insurance Program, 
took force.
42
  As mentioned before, these three model programs offer different benefit 
schemes according to three different rationales for allocating social welfare benefits: 
desert, insurance, and need. 
¶22 The Invalids Law is based on principles of desert.43  It establishes a comprehensive 
system of in-kind and in-cash benefits that responds to the needs of disabled veterans 
through a well-developed system of social services.
44
  The Work Injury Program is based 
on principles of insurance and desert.
45
  This program is not open to any worker who paid 
social insurance and became disabled; instead, its benefits are limited to those workers 
whose injury was work-related.
46
  The individuals who qualify for this program enjoy a 
basic allowance that is determined by one‘s previous income; in most cases, beneficiaries 
receive an adequate income as a result.
47
  The beneficiaries of this program are also 
entitled to supplemental income as well as additional related allowances.
48
  The 
Disability Insurance Program, which stands at the center of this study, was enacted in 
1974 as part of a general reform of Israel‘s social welfare policies.  This reform was 
intended to gradually eliminate the public assistance system and expand the social 
security regime.
 49
  Although celebrated by politicians and policymakers as exhibiting a 
turn from charity to rights,
50
 the disability insurance program was ultimately based on the 
principle of need, in essence replicating the structure of the public assistance program 
that preceded it.  The program granted a minimal allowance, (20% and later on 25% of 
the average wage in Israel, not very different from former grants), which was later denied 
when program participants found employment.  The program also established a 
mechanism for obtaining an attendance allowance and, later on, a mobility allowance was 
added.  The law also provided rehabilitation services, but this branch was not well 
developed.  
¶23 Israel was slow to develop social services for the general population of disabled 
people.  As a result, a community of voluntary private sector organizations evolved 
which filled the role of providing services to disabled people.
51
  The laws relating to such 
                                               
41 The term for public assistance benefits in Israel was Sa'ad. The Sa'ad was a residual welfare program 
that granted benefits to people who lived in poverty and had no other means of support.  Between Charity, 
Welfare and Warfare, supra note 10, at 92–108 (providing a detailed description of the Sa'ad system). 
42 National Insurance Law (consolidated version), 5755–1995, Chapter 9 §§ 195–225B (originally passed 
as National Insurance (Amendment No.  13) Law, 5733–1973, 27 LSI 233 (1972–1973) (lsr.)).  The formal 
name for the disability insurance program is ―Invalidity Insurance,‖ but I call it general disability insurance, 
or disability insurance. 
43 Gal, supra note 29, at 226–27. 
44 Between Charity, Welfare and Warfare, supra note 10, at 116–17, 119–22. 
45 Gal, supra note 29, at 235–36. 
46 Id. 
47 Work injury allowance is calculated as 75% of one‘s previous income up to three times average wage.  
See National Insurance Law, 5714–1954, 8 LSI 4 (1953–1954). 
48 Assurance of Income Law, 5741–1980, 35 LSI  28 (1980–1981); Between Charity, Welfare and Warfare, 
supra note 10. 
49 ABRAHAM DORON & RALPH M. KRAMER, THE WELFARE STATE IN ISRAEL: THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY POLICY AND PRACTICE 14–16, 32–35 (1991); JOHN GAL, SOCIAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL 29–31 
(2004). 
50  Raphael Roter & Nira Shamai, Disability Insurance, 6–7 SOC. INSURANCE 18, 19 (1974) (Hebrew) 
(translated by author). 
51 RALPH M. KRAMER, THE VOLUNTARY SERVICE AGENCY IN ISRAEL (1976). 
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services at the time were mainly protective, and they only weakly regulated the treatment 




¶24 During the 1980s, parents of children with disabilities and disabled people 
themselves began challenging the social structure that effectively rendered disabled 
people marginal and useless.
53
  This activism increased in the 1990s, and it ultimately 




B. The Rise of Disability Rights  
¶25 Disability rights were first introduced in Israel during the 1990s.  In 1992, the first 
disability rights organization in the country, Bizchut, initiated a campaign to create a 
comprehensive disability rights law.
55
  Eventually, a unique disability rights scheme 
evolved: it followed the American example of the ADA while integrating Scandinavian 
influences and local experience.
56
  This local rights formula was the basis for the Equal 
Rights for People with Disabilities Bill (ERPWD Bill) that was submitted to the Knesset, 
the Israeli parliament, in 1996.
57
  The Bill‘s provisions addressed almost every aspect of 
the lives of people with disabilities: accessibility, employment, education, culture and 
leisure, health, housing, and more.  Together, these elements realized the ERPWD Bill‘s 
vision of equality and dignity.  The language that this legislation created was new to the 
Israeli legal community as well as to many local disability activists.  Following the 
submission of the ERPWD Bill, the government nominated a Public Committee for a 
                                               
52 See, e.g., Welfare (Treatment of Retarded Persons) Law, 5729–1969, 23 LSI  144 (1969) (lsr.); Mentally 
Sick Persons Law, 5715–1955, 9 LSI 132 (1955) (lsr.). 
53 Sagit Mor, Disability Rights in Israel: Between Socio-Political and Legal Recognition, in ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 79 (Jonny Gal & Mimi Eisenstadt eds., 2009), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/sagitmor/4 (Hebrew) (translated by author); Sagit Mor, Towards Radicalization 
of Disability Insurance—Chronicles of a Struggle for Social Change, 4 LAW, SOC‘Y & CULTURE 91 (2008) 
(Hebrew) (translated by author), available at http://works.bepress.com/sagitmor/3/ (follow ―Download‖ 
hyperlink). 
54 Equal Rights of People with Disabilities Law, 5758-1998, S.H. 152 (1998); Towards Radicalization of 
Disability Insurance, supra note 53, at 121–30. 
55 At a press conference announcing the establishment of Bizchut, the organization declared:  
For the first time in Israel, an organization has been established to promote the interests 
and rights of people with disabilities in the spirit of the values of the Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel, and to bring the principles of integration within the community and of 
anti-discrimination into practice. . . .  ‗Bizchut‘ wishes to eradicate the prejudices and 
paternalism towards populations with special needs, in order that they be an integral part 
of Israeli society, Bizchut ve-lo be-chesed (by right rather than by charity). 
Press Release, Bizchut (Dec. 5, 1993) (Hebrew) (translated by author) (on file with author) (announcing the 
establishment of Bizchut, a center for human rights for people with disabilities in Israel). 
56 Neta Ziv, Disability Law in Israel and the United States—A Comparative Perspective, 1999 ISR. Y.B. ON 
HUM. RTS. 171 (1999); Stanley S. Herr, Reforming Disability Nondiscrimination Laws: A Comparative 
Perspective, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305 (2002) (examining the effect of the ADA on disability reform in 
Israel, the United Kingdom and Sweden). 
57 Equal Rights for People with Disabilities Bill, 5756-1996, H.H. 628.  The Bill was drafted by Bizchut 
and was submitted to the Knesset by eleven Knesset members. 
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Comprehensive Review of the Legislation Regarding People with Disabilities.
58
  The 
public committee conducted a thorough investigation regarding the legal and social 
conditions of disabled people in Israel, which it published in July 1997.
59
  
¶26 Soon afterwards, a political compromise led to a split in the ERPWD Bill, and only 
some parts of its original full version were brought before the Knesset.
 60
  As a result, 
when the ERPWDL was passed in 1998, it included only two operative chapters, 
addressing employment and access to public transportation.
61
  Nevertheless, the passage 




¶27 This Article focuses on the era that followed this legislative accomplishment, an era 
that was marked by coalition building and solidarity in action on the one hand, and by 
conflicts and tensions on the other.  The debates during this period primarily concerned 
the direction the movement should take, the definition of the most important and pressing 
issues around which to unite, and the ways to promote them. 
IV. THE DISABILITY ALLOWANCES PROTESTS  
A. Agenda and Achievements  
¶28 The end of the 1990s saw a revival of disability activism and the development of 
new disability organizations that encompassed almost every aspect of the lives of 
disabled people.
63
  This activity produced little change, however, and participants began 
to grow frustrated.
64
  Activists began to disagree on the appropriate language through 
which to direct the new movement‘s efforts.  While some preferred to focus on the newly 
introduced rights discourse, others were still concerned primarily with social welfare 
benefits, particularly disability allowances.  Nevertheless, disability rights activists as a 
whole seemed to be empowered by the mobilizing force of the emerging disability 
movement. 
¶29 Around this time, two sit-in strike campaigns took place, one in 1999 and one in 
2001.
65
  Disabled people organized these campaigns, and they were quite successful in 
                                               
58  THE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC COMMITTEE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATION 
REGARDING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (1997) (Hebrew) (translated by author) [hereinafter PUBLIC 
COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
59
 Id.  In this Article I shall refer to the report in two ways: I refer to the analysis, data, and 
recommendations of the report as the ―Public Committee Report,‖ and I refer to specific proposals within 
the report as the ―ERPWD Bill.‖ 
60 The compromise was suggested by Saul Yahalom, the head of the Knesset Committee which prepared 
the Bill. Yahalom was nominated to be the Minister of Transportation. He was eager to pass the two 
sections that the committee finalized in order to make sure that the law passed and was not pushed back by 
the next head of the committee. Ariela Auphir & Dan Orenstein, Equal Rights for People with Disabilities 
Law, 1998: Emancipation at the End of the 20th Century, in MENACHEM GOLDBERG BOOK 42, 52–54 
(Aharon Barak et al. eds., 2002) (Hebrew) (translated by author). 
61 Id.; Ziv, supra note 56.  
62 Auphir & Orenstein, supra note 60, at 87. 
63 See sources cited supra note 53. 
64 See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.  
65 Hila Rimon-Greenspan, Disability Politics in Israel: Civil Society, Advocacy, and Contentious Politics, 
27 SOC‘Y FOR DISABILITY STUD. (2007), available at http://www.dsq-sds.org/article/view/47/47; see also 
Arie Rimmerman & Stanley S. Herr, The Power of the Powerless: A Study on the Israeli Disability Strike 
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bringing the issue of disability allowances to the forefront of the national agenda.
66
  The 
campaigns spurred strong and compassionate public support.  During the protests, a core 
of activists, mainly with mobility impairments, lived in a tent in front of government 
buildings in Jerusalem.
67
  The activists demanded the increase of disability insurance 
allowances to the point where they would be compatible with the minimum wage in 
Israel, which is regarded as a minimum standard of dignified living; disability allowances 
for homemakers and for the elderly; disability healthcare services; and more.  Both 
strikes came to an end after the relevant Israeli government office signed an agreement 
accepting some of the strikers‘ demands.
68
  The significance of these protests transcended 
their concrete results.  Both incidents became seminal moments in the movement, unique 
instances in which the voices of disabled people were heard, and rare moments of 
solidarity between disabled and nondisabled people in Israeli society. 
¶30 The first of these campaigns lasted thirty-five days.69  It was initiated in 1999 by a 
grassroots group of individuals
70
 in response both to increasing economic hardship that 
resulted from the inadequacy of disability insurance allowances,
71
 and to disappointment 
with the ERPWDL, which had not yet brought about significant changes.
72
  This initial 
group was comprised mainly of persons with mobility impairments and was later joined 
by others. 
¶31 While the campaign began with a broad agenda that included issues of 
accessibility, housing, and the implementation of the ERPWDL, these issues quickly 
dissipated, and the campaign ultimately focused on issues surrounding disability benefits, 
such as disability insurance stipends, mobility allowances, and the low rates, narrow 
scope, and outdated structure of personal attendance allowances.
73
  The protest ended 
with great achievements for the activists: The Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance 
surrendered to their demands.
74
  This marked the first time that a street protest about 
                                                                                                                                            
of 1999, 15 J. DISABILITY POL‘Y STUD. 12 (2004), http://dps.sagepub.com/content/15/1/12 (discussing the 
1999 protest and its implications). 
66 See Interview with Arie Zudkevich, Co-founder and Director, Campaign for Handicapped Persons in Isr., 
& Yoav Kraim, Spokesperson, Campaign for Handicapped Persons in Isr. (May 9, 2002) (on file with 
author); In Struggle – The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vols. 1, 2, 3, CAMPAIGN FOR THE HANDICAPPED 
IN ISR. (dating 2001, 2002, 2003 consecutively) (Hebrew) (translated by author); CAMPAIGN FOR THE 
HANDICAPPED IN ISR., http://www.nechim4u.com/ (translated by author). 
67 See sources cited supra note 66. 
68 See infra notes 72 (for the first campaign) and 85 (for the second campaign) and accompanying text for 
the results of each strike. 
69 See In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 1, CAMPAIGN FOR THE HANDICAPPED IN ISR. 
(March 2001) (Hebrew) (translated by author), for a discussion of the strike and its achievements.  This 
bulletin was published by the Campaign for the Handicapped, an organization that was formed during the 
1999 strike and that led the second strike.  Id. 
70 Id. 
71  Disability insurance allowances were not only insufficient in the first place, but also had not been 
updated over more than two years to match the rise in the standard of living, and therefore suffered 
continuing deterioration.  Interview with Simha Benita, Founder, Mazor Ass‘n & activist, Bizchut (May 13, 
2002) (on file with author).  See Einat Fishbein, The Disabled Are Opening a Struggle on Their Rights: We 
Have Nothing to Live on, HA‘ARETZ, Sept. 29, 1999, http://www.haaretz.co.il (Hebrew) (translated by 
author), for background on the strike. 
72 Interview with Benita, supra note 71. 
73 Fishbein, supra note 71. 
74 See In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 1, supra note 69. 
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social welfare issues had succeeded in Israel.  It yielded significant changes in mobility 
and attendance allowances and a rise in disability insurance payments for the ―severely 
disabled.‖
75
  During the protest, a new organization, the Campaign for Handicapped 
Persons in Israel (Campaign for the Handicapped), was established.
76
  The Campaign for 
the Handicapped understood the protest's achievements to be only a first step in a broader 
effort to improve the living conditions of disabled people.
77
 
¶32 The second sit-in strike campaign took place in 2000 and 2001 and lasted seventy-
seven days.
78
  On the agenda was a general reform in disability allowances that would 
benefit the majority of disabled people who live on disability insurance, and not just the 
few who are ―severely‖ disabled.
79
  The goals were few and specific, though still steep.  
The activists aspired to bring disability insurance on par with minimum wage rates 
(including an allowance for people whose benefits were below the minimum income 
rate), to allow disabled people who had reached pension age to receive both disability 
insurance and old-age pensions as well as other disability-related benefits,
80
 to equalize 
healthcare benefits and services among all disabled people (bringing them on par with 




¶33 Public support for the protest was accompanied by extensive media coverage.  
Many disabled people who were not part of the organizing group joined the strikers or 
supported them from afar.  Non-disabled people joined the strikers as well, bringing food 
and other forms of assistance.
82
  A group of students studying Chinese medicine came to 
give free massage treatments to the strikers, and some of Israel‘s leading singers 
participated in a Live Aid-type concert for the disabled.
83
  The protest also prompted 
newspaper columnists to criticize Israel‘s unjust social and economic policies, including, 
for instance, the government‘s preference for funding settlements in the occupied 
territories over the needs of citizens located well within Israeli borders.
84
 
¶34 This second campaign ended with achievements as well.  The agreement that was 
signed with the government (the Prime Minister‘s Office) at the end of the protest 
included a 20% general increase in disability allowances (instead of the 100% that they 
                                               
75 Id. at 8–11.    
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 See In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 2, CAMPAIGN FOR THE HANDICAPPED IN ISR. 
(March 2002) (Hebrew) (translated by author) (discussing the strike and its achievements). 
79 Id. 
80 Previously, a disabled person would switch from disability insurance to old-age pension, which was 
many times lower than the disability allowance, and was denied other benefits (such as mobility and 
attendance allowances).   
81 In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 3 17, CAMPAIGN FOR THE HANDICAPPED IN ISR. 
(Spring 2003) (Hebrew) (translated by author). 
82 Ruti Sinai & Haim Shadmi, The Ministry of Finance Fights Back: The Cost of Disability Allowances is 9 
Milliard Shekls, HA‘ARETZ, Jan. 11, 2002, http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/1/167913 (Hebrew) (translated by 
author). 
83  Attila Somfalvi & Efrat Weiss, Ten Thousand Demonstrators in a Protest for the Disabled, YNET 
ONLINE, Jan, 23, 2001, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-1575731,00.html (Hebrew) (translated by 
author).  
84  Anat Gov, The Public’s Right to Know, YNET ONLINE, Dec. 26, 2001, 
http://www.ynet.co/il/articles/0,7340,L-1466608,FF.html (Hebrew) (translated by author) (claiming that 
―with the money that we have, we could have been a state where the disabled smile‖). 
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demanded), a promise to grant disability allowances to people whose earned income was 
below the minimum wage, a guarantee that disabled benefits would not be eliminated 
upon reaching pension age, and a commitment to appoint a public committee to study and 
offer operative suggestions to improve disability-related social welfare policy.
85
  
¶35 The achievements of these two campaigns were remarkable.  The protests became a 
demonstration of solidarity both among disabled people as a community and between 
disabled people and the public at large; as a historical triumph of a powerless group in 
society over the powerful bureaucracy; as a unique moment in which social welfare 
became an issue in every home, and disabled people became visible, assertive, and 
relevant in national politics.
86
  One of the strengths of the struggle was its emotionality, 
but as I will discuss below, the protests were also criticized for using the politics of 
mercy and pity. 
B. Criticisms and Doubts  
¶36 These campaigns, in which grassroots voices of disability activists presented 
general disability allowances as the most pressing matter in disabled people‘s lives, 
spurred a conflict among journalists, commentators, and rights activists, who viewed the 
protests with mixed reactions, to the implied message regarding the place of disabled 
people in society.   
¶37 Arie Zudkevich, the leader of both campaigns, presented disability as a condition 
associated with misfortune and suffering when he addressed the candidates in the race for 
the office of Prime Minister in 1999: 
We are talking about the disabled who have been hit by misfortune twice, 
once for being disabled, and a second time for being forced to live on the 
shameful and shaming [resource allocation under the] state budget of all 
Israeli governments ever since. . . .  These people cannot fight to improve 
their living conditions; therefore, we have founded our organization . . . 
and have promised to serve as their mouthpiece and to fight with our 
ultimate powers for us all . . . . 
You who have met our people and know their suffering, you who have 
seen the pain in our eyes, should acknowledge the terrible injustice we 
have suffered.  We hope to bring new hope . . . so that we will no longer 
watch the shameful spectacles of the disabled drifting through 
(mitgolelim) the freezing streets of Jerusalem.
87
 
                                               
85 In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 3, supra note 81, at 12–14.   
86 Neta Ziv, People with Disabilities—Between Social Rights and Existential Needs, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 813 (Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany eds., 2004) (Hebrew) (translated by 
author); Rimmerman & Herr, supra note 65 (naming their article The Power of the Powerless). 
87 In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 1, supra note 69, at 12–13.  Note the difference 
between the remarks of Zudkevich and text by Kraim, infra note 98.  The differences between the texts 
deserves a more concrete analysis as they represent two generations within the movement (Zudkevich, the 
older, and Kraim, the younger) and two phases in the struggle (Zudkevich at the end of the 1999 strike, 
Kraim at the end of the 2001 strike.  Still, I believe they demonstrate the tensions within the struggle and in 
the messages that the struggle communicated to the outside world. 
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¶38 One journalist observed that the first sit-in strike was a ―victory of tears.‖88  Others 
noted that the strike had been a ―performance of misery‖
89
 and a ―one-dimensional 
representation [of disabled people] as miserable[,] . . . as a minority that lives on the 
margins, a social burden.‖
90
  ―This attitude,‖ Kimmerling warned, ―brings us closer to 
societies that have [promoted] physical extinction of unworthy non-contributing elements 
in society.‖
91
  In this view, the image of disabled people in these strikes was not of equal 
citizens fighting for their rights, but of a marginal group begging for compassion.
92
  ―It 
was a victory of misery,‖ one history professor explained, because ―you were forced to 
undress yourself, to expose your impairments, to recruit some journalists that would bring 
them to light, and only in this way could you win.  Is this the society we wanted?  This is 
a return to [the mentality of] the village [of the Diaspora], to charity collections (kupat 
tzdaka).‖
93
  From this perspective, the exposure of the participants‘ impairments in public 
was communicated as a call for mercy and not an act of dignity. 
¶39 For disability rights advocates, a struggle over disability allowances was not the 
street struggle they were hoping for but instead an anachronistic struggle that could have 
undermined the very disability rights project.
94
  Thus, while they did provide legal 
counseling services to the protesters behind the scenes, they did not join the sit-in strike 
in full force.  They neither sat in the tent, nor lobbied Knesset members and government 
officials, and did not take any overtly active role in the efforts.  The protocols from that 
period of Bizchut, the organization that initiated the enactment of the ERPWDL, indeed 
reveal inner conflicts, and interviews conducted with activists likewise show that heated 
debates were taking place with regard to whether Bizchut and the Coalition to Promote 
the ERPWDL should be more actively involved.
95
  
¶40 These protests represented a dual movement in relation to disability rights activism: 
continuity and departure.  They represented continuity because they manifested the 
                                               
88 Einat Fishbein, The Victory of Tears, HA‘ARETZ, Nov. 10, 1999 (Hebrew) (translated by author).  The 
tears refer to the turning point in the first strike when the mother of a disabled child started crying and 
Knesset members and reporters were carried away and cried with her. 
89 Rita, (June 13, 2002, 9:04 AM) YNET COMMUNITY BLOG, http://www.ynet.co.il/home/1,7340,L-869-
7949-1482850,00.html (Hebrew) (translated by author). 




 A survey by Rimmerman and Herr of media representation of the 1999 strike concluded that ―it is not 
surprising that the participants of the strike were more often described in the Israeli press as objects of pity 
rather than activists struggling for their rights.‖ Rimmerman & Herr, supra note 65, at 15; see also Ziv, 
supra note 86, at 843–44.   
93 Fishbein, supra note 88 (quoting Daniel Gutwein). 
94 See infra Part V.B. 
95  Interview with Rivka Sneh, Co-founder, YATED – Children with Down Syndrome,& Co-founder 
Bizchut (May 13, 2002) (on file with author); Interview with Gideon Drori, The Parents Lobby for Cmty. 
Living, Co-founder. Bizchut (May 12, 2002) (on file with author); Interview with Simcha Benita, Founder, 
Mazor Ass‘n, Activist, Bizchut (May 13, 2002) (on file with author); Interview with Achiya Kamara, Co-
founder & Executive Director, Bekol (May 14, 2002) (on file with author); Interview with Ariela Auphir, 
Executive Director, 1996–2000, Bizchut, Commissioner, 2000–2001, Equal Rights for People with 
Disability (May 14, 2002) (on file with author); Sylvia Tessler Lozovick, Executive Director, 2000–07, 
Bizchut, (May 12, 2002) (on file with author); Interview with Neta Ziv. Co-founder & Board Member, 
Bizchut (May 15, 2002) (on file with author); PROTOCOLS OF STEERING COMM. MEETINGS, BIZCHUT 
(Hebrew) (translated by author) (on file with the author). 
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growing visibility and assertiveness of disabled people, and they represented departure, 
on the other hand, because they seemed a massive step backwards to reliance on charity 
and pity.   
¶41 Yuval Elbashan, then legal counsel to a social justice organization called Yedid, 
has expressed a very different view on the tactics that these campaigns involved: He 
found the tears both subversive and rebellious, and therefore consistent with the struggle 
as a whole.  According to Elbashan, ―there is nothing more legitimate . . . [than] taking 
the game to where you have the advantage.‖
96
  While normally the game is ruled by 
inaccessible economics, he explained, this time disabled people themselves have set the 
rules of the game—the rule of tears.
97
  
V. COMPETING MEANINGS OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES 
A. A Social Welfare Perspective  
1. Hope, Solidarity, and Strength 
¶42 For the organizers of the 1999 and the 2001 campaigns and for people who joined 
them, the protests were a demonstration of hope, solidarity, and strength.  As Yoav 
Kraim, the spokesperson of the Campaign for the Handicapped, wrote in the 
organization‘s bulletin after the 2001 protest: 
After long years of walking in the desert with no pastor, we have finally 
reached the gates of the Promised Land.  We can now state that the 
disabled populace has left behind any last remains of paternalism and 
represents itself with dignity and with no mediators. . . .  Our two most 
important achievements: first—the power of working together . . . and 
second—the public‘s understanding of the needs of all disabled: the 
mentally disabled, sensory disabled, physically disabled, and cognitive 
disabled.   
 
The public knows today that a disabled person is a human being too, 
bearing rights.  We too share the image of God. . . .  Furthermore, the 
disabled populace is leaving its ―closet‖ behind today and is starting to lift 
its head.  The shame that society has granted us is disappearing, and we 
now march to the light of human dignity.  This light will guide the State of 
Israel . . . to become a society that manages its economic affairs as well in 
terms of values and fundamental needs.  In this way, we have provided the 
entire public with renewed dignity.
98
  
¶43 Organized by disabled people and conducted in the streets, the campaigns 
represented a grassroots struggle in which disabled people forced society to notice them, 
address their hardships, and consequently deal with its own responsibility for past 
injustices. 
                                               
96 Fishbein, supra note 88 (quoting Yuval Elbashan). 
97 Id. 
98 In Struggle—The Bulletin of the Disabled Union, Vol. 3, supra note 81, at 15 (emphasis omitted). 
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¶44 The images of misery and suffering did not seem to bother the activists so much: 
They drew public attention, and the activists did not perceive them as contradicting the 
goals of the movement.  Exposing their impairments and economic destitution entailed a 
direct challenge to the ―closet‖ of shame that had been imposed on them.  As Zudkevich 
blatantly put it, they truly felt ―hit by misfortune twice‖
99
—indeed, they did not see 
society as responsible for the ―misfortune‖ of disablement, yet they did consider it 
responsible for their impoverishment.   
2. Disability Allowances as a Means of Survival 
¶45 Financial destitution, inadequate healthcare services, and lack of sufficient societal 
and governmental support were indeed at the center of the protests.  The welfare activists 
who led the protests viewed disability allowances as the most pressing issue, while civil 
rights could wait for later stages in the overall struggle; civil rights were not entirely 
beyond the scope of this struggle, but their priority was low.  In the 1999 protest, for 
instance, disability rights were included in the initial agenda but were soon abandoned.  
Top priority was given to disability allowances due to their fundamental role in ensuring 
disabled people‘s very existence—their economic security and physical survival.  Thus, 
Arie Zudkevich said: ―Everyone agreed that allowances were the first priority—first of 
all: to stay alive.‖
100
  Simha Benita, one of the campaign organizers, was quoted in an 
interview that announced the launching of the first strike: ―The ground is burning under 
our feet . . . we have nothing to live on, and nobody notices us.  Indeed, it is not easy to 
take the disabled outside their homes for a demonstration, but this time we are going to 
fight and bring hundreds [of people] until we get attention.‖
101
  Momo Nekave, another 
prominent activist, was cited as saying: ―Our people are desperate.  Our struggle is about 
the right to life, because in the current situation many are hardly alive.‖
102
 
¶46 The formulation of disability allowances as guaranteed by the right to life 
resembles a similar attempt in the United States to formulate welfare benefits as rights.  
That view was promoted by the welfare rights movement that flourished for a short while 
during the 1960s.  As early as 1955, A. Dalefield Smith, a legal scholar and an early 
advocate of welfare rights in the United States, had developed the approach that viewed 
welfare benefits as stemming from the fundamental ―right to life,‖ based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
103
  That argument failed, and the 
welfare advocates turned to due process rights as a way of ensuring benefits for indigent 
people (using Charles Reich‘s theory of the ―New Property‖).
104
  The welfare rights 
movement enjoyed success in courts during the 1960s, and then its influence declined 
without leaving much impact on the United States rights discourse.
105
 
                                               
99 Id. 
100 Interview with Zudkevich, supra note 66 (emphasis added). 
101 Fishbein, supra note 88. 
102 Ruti Sinai, How Do You Live on 1,740 NIS a Month?, HA‘ARETZ, Feb. 20, 2002 (Hebrew) (translated by 
author) (emphasis added). 
103 See A. DELAFIELD SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE (1955). 
104 See Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE—WHAT 
THEY SHOULD BE 65 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971) (chronicling the struggle); MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL 
NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 (1995) (chronicling the movement); 
see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
105 Sparer, supra note 104; DAVIS, supra note 104. 
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3. Disability Allowances as a Matter of Rights 
¶47 Formulating disability allowances as a matter of rights was also a central concern in 
tenBroek and Matson‘s seminal 1966 article The Disabled and the Law of Welfare.
106
  
Writing just at the birth of the disability movement, tenBroek and Matson provided an 
eloquent critique of the then-existing social security mechanisms, comparing social 
insurance and public assistance programs for disabled people.
107
  TenBroek and Matson 
argued in favor of strong and progressive social insurance mechanisms that ―maximize 
similarity, normality and equality as between the disabled and the able-bodied,‖
108
 and 
which follow the goals of ―economic opportunity, social equality, and personal 
dignity.‖
109
  They further explained that social insurance is a better form of social welfare 
policy because the covered participants can ―claim the benefits as a matter of right.‖
110
  
¶48 There is indeed a difference between social insurance and public assistance as two 
distinct social security mechanisms.
111
  Public assistance is usually conditioned on a 
means test that includes a relatives‘ liability component.
112
  It is a benevolent giving of a 
state-run charity—a discretionary, stigmatizing, and deterring mechanism, which is based 
on an individual assessment and results in a conferred-upon allowance rather than a 
right.
113
  In contrast, social insurance is considered establishing a firm right which is 
unconditioned by income and means test and is unrelated to family liability; the payments 
are granted according to unified and egalitarian rules, and enjoy social legitimacy without 
deterring eligible beneficiaries.
114
  Moreover, public assistance programs are not intended 
to allow a life of dignity and security.  They are only intended to provide minimal relief 
that is essentially insufficient because it provides support that is lower than the minimum 
needed.
115
  In contrast, social insurance is supposed to allow economic security as a 
matter of right as well as human dignity.
116
 
¶49 The reality of social security, however, is that disability allowances programs do 
not follow the clear distinction described above.  Public assistance programs have 
acquired some features of social insurance, while social insurance programs retain some 
                                               
106 TenBroek & Matson, supra note 15. 
107 See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 15. 
108 Id. at 816 (emphasis added) (depicting the basic features of ―integrationism‖, the new approach to 
disability which they advocate in their article, as opposed to ―custodialism‖).   The authors go on to explain 
that ideal social security schemes correspond with integrationism while public assistance mechanisms 
accord a custodial approach.  Id. at 818. 
109 Id. at 840. 
110 Id. at 818.   
111  The following comparison is based on a table that summarizes the differences between the two 
mechanisms.  DORON & KRAMER, supra note 49, at 65; see also tenBroek & Matson, supra note 15 
(discussing in detail the features and principles of the U.S. social security programs); Weber, supra note 28 
(discussing in detail the features and principles of the United States‘ social security programs); Matthew 
Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
361 (1996). 









  The lines between the two were particularly blurred 
in Israel.  Although the general program of disability allowances is entitled ―disability 
insurance,‖ it essentially exhibits public assistance features, by primarily relying on the 
principle of need.
118
  The result is that even disabled workers who have paid social 
insurance throughout their working life receive inadequate allowances that provide 
merely minimal relief.
119
  This is because they were not injured in work-related 
circumstances, but rather during mundane events. 
¶50 Formulating disability allowances as a matter of rights became an issue for the 
Campaign for the Handicapped as well.  After the 2001 protest, the activists increasingly 
talked about allowances as rights, as well as a mechanism that aims to close the gap 
between the living expenses of disabled and nondisabled individuals.
120
  The size of the 
gap, they argued, depends on the level of services provided by the state.
121
  Moreover, 
they advocated the acknowledgement of: 
disability allowances [as] an investment that allows the disabled person to 
secure his unique needs, to integrate into the life of the country and 
contribute to it.  We need a new balance between disability and wage-
earning so that the disabled and the state will pursue the integration of the 
disabled person as an active and productive worker, . . . and so that the 
quality of life of the disabled will not decline.
122
 
4. From Welfare to Work 
¶51 The protests focused primarily on practical solutions for improving the level of 
benefits and changing the program‘s structure.  The agreement with the government at 
the end of the 2001 campaign included a provision that guaranteed the establishment of a 
public committee.
123
  One of the committee‘s major expected tasks was to discuss ways 
to encourage and provide incentives for disabled people to work and earn their income, 
while still ensuring the existence of mechanisms that guarantee easy transition to 
economic independence (for example eligibility for an allowance if income is below 
minimum standards).
124
  The Campaign for the Handicapped had indeed insisted on the 
establishment of such a committee and participated in its proceedings.
125
  The Public 
Committee to Review Matters Concerning Disabled People and to Advance Their 
Inclusion in the Community (also named the Laron Committee, after Judge Laron, the 
                                               
117 See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 15 (analyzing disability allowances in the United States); DORON & 
KRAMER, supra note 49 (analyzing disability allowances in Israel).  
118 See DORON & KRAMER, supra note 49; Gal, supra note 29.  
119 Gal, supra note 29. 
120  Memorandum from the Campaign for the Handicapped Persons in Isr. to Isr. Gov‘t (May 9, 2002) 
(Hebrew) (translated by author) (on file with author) (regarding the establishment of a public committee, as 
part of the agreement that was reached at the end of the 2001/2002 strike) 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 See supra note 85. 
124 Id.  
125 Memorandum from the Campaign of the Handicapped Persons in Isr., supra note 120. 
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head of the committee) published its report in March 2005 (Laron Report).
126
  Thus far, 
the Laron Report has yielded one substantial achievement: a recent amendment to the 
National Insurance Law, which created a mechanism that allows disabled people who 
earn low wages not to lose their allowance at once, but rather in a gradual process, 
depending on their level of income and years of work.
127
 
¶52 Ironically, the Campaign for the Handicapped encountered much criticism 
regarding its role in the report proceedings.  It was argued that its representatives had 
deserted the goals and the people they represented by participating in the committee.
128
 
Laron Report opponents argued that:  
The report perpetuates historical injustice: the link between allowances 
and wage income.  We argue: It is the right of a disabled person to work 
and earn wages with dignity, without losing his allowance, which is the 
existing situation among other groups of disabled persons.  Once and for 
all, this link should be broken, or, alternatively, all disability allowances 
and eligibility criteria should be put on equal grounds.
129
 
The heated debate surrounding the Laron Report again reinforces the argument regarding 
the central role that disability allowances play in disability politics in Israel. 
5. Understanding Disability, Poverty, and Rights  
¶53 The social welfare perspective as depicted here and as illustrated in the protests is a 
compelling one because it is rooted in the life experiences of disabled people.  In the 
following discussion, I confront it with a disability rights perspective, and with additional 
critical approaches towards disability, poverty, and rights, suggesting that a new 
conceptualization for disability allowances is needed.  Under the social welfare view of 
disability allowances, the relationships between disability and poverty are complex, but 
still remain within the framework of overlap rather than mutual constitution.  For welfare 
activists, poverty was the mark of inferiority.  Indeed, the correlation between disability 
and poverty was a matter of state responsibility, but the boundaries between the poor and 
the disabled were maintained as two distinct spheres of policy and activism.   
                                               
126 LARON REPORT (2005), available at http://users.tapuz.co.il/forums/laron-x.pdf (Hebrew) (translated by 
author).  A comprehensive analysis of the report‘s recommendations is beyond the scope of this project at 
this point.  A basic fault of the report is its understanding of unemployment as a problem of the disabled 
person, and not as a social problem of imposed disablement.  The report advances the entrance of disabled 
people into the labor market, but ignores the societal aspects of employment discrimination and other 
structural problems.  In addition, the levels of disability allowances basically remained the same, in other 
words, at poverty levels.  Although, according to the report, people who go to work will not lose their 
benefits at once, the reform does not improve the economic situation of people who live on disability 
insurance alone.  See Kobi Cohen, THE LARON REPORT—WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO STOP ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION, available at http://mate.ios.st/IOS/Users/mate.ios.st/Files/3546613314.pdf (Hebrew) 
(translated by author), for a fully developed critique of the report. 
127 National Insurance (Amendment 109) Law, 5768-2008 S.H. 671 (2008) (lsr.). 
128 See supra note 126, for the opponents‘ critique.  The opposition to the report led to a new alliance of 
disabled people who even initiated a new strike against the report in October 2005.   
129 COHEN, supra note 126, at 9.  This latest development in disability activism not only offers a more 
radical view of disability allowances, but also questions the disparities among disabled people and exposes 
them to public discussion. 
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¶54 The grand vision of the disability activists who led the sit-in strikes included not 
only the ―here and now,‖ but also a future vision of rights, dignity, participation, and, 
ultimately, of integration into the labor market.  Yet what they neglected to address and 
analyze is the role of discrimination and exclusion in the current situation.  They also 
overlooked aspects relating to the social construction of disability and the role of the state 
and of society in the continuing disablement of persons.  Still, their undisputed 
contribution was raising the need for a new conceptualization of disability allowances 
that captures the complex barriers that disabled people encounter, including 
unemployment and extra costs of living.  The remaining major challenge would therefore 
be to articulate and to structure general disability allowances not as compensation for 
being disabled but rather as a way for society to pay for its major contribution to 
processes of disablement and exclusion. 
B. A Disability Rights Perspective  
1. Ignoring Disability Allowances 
¶55 The disability rights perspective on disability allowances is not easily portrayed.  
At first glance it might seem as if disability rights advocates have no position with regard 
to disability allowances because disability allowances are virtually absent from the 
disability rights scheme.  Yet a closer look reveals a mix of explicit and implicit reasons 
for this absence, reasons which have also shaped the mixed responses to the 1999 and 
2001 protests.   
¶56 In the discussion below, I analyze the disability rights discourse that evolved in 
Israel during the 1990s.  The analysis will not focus on the ERPWDL alone, but rather 
will examine the ERPWDL together with the ERPWD Bill and the Public Committee 
Report as a series of legal documents that together encompass a broader picture of the 
disability rights vision in Israel during that era.
130
 
¶57 The disability rights model that has evolved in Israel was guided by progressive 
ideas, including careful attention to social welfare mechanisms, but it eventually ignored 
the issue of disability allowances.  This local rights scheme was based on what the 
drafters identified as two dominant approaches to progressive disability legislation: 
non-discrimination and adequate services.
131
  The first component referred to the Anglo-
American approach that emphasized non-discrimination tools and relied, especially in the 
United States, on the legacy of the civil rights movement.
132
  The second component was 
                                               
130  The ERPWDL eventually included only four parts of the original proposal: general principles, 
accessibility to public transportation, employment equality, and the establishment of an Equal Rights 
Commission for disabled people. Equal Rights of People with Disabilities Law, 5758-1998, S.H. 152 
(1998).  Therefore, it cannot be considered as representing the entire disability rights advocates‘ vision.  
However, I will refer to the ERPWDL where the discussion involves specific provisions that were enacted 
into law. 
131 Ziv, supra note 56, at 176–77.  Ziv emphasizes the innovativeness that lies in such a combined approach 
and argues that it can serve as a model for disability rights laws.  Id. at 201–02; see also Public PUBLIC 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 19; Auphir & Orenstein, supra note 60, at 56; Herr, supra note 
56.  The ERPWD Bill included a specific chapter dedicated to Special Needs.  See ERPWD Bill, supra note 
59, §§35–38.  A stricter translation of the original concept of adequate services would be something like 
―appropriate-response to special needs” (see Equal Rights of People with Disabilities Law §2).  
132 Ziv, supra note 56, at 194–97; Herr, supra note 56. 
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a lesson from the Scandinavian approach, which focused on the state‘s duty to provide 
adequate services and the complementary entitlements that individuals have to receive 
those services.
133
  The drafters of the scheme understood this combined model to 
represent a better understanding of the nature of both disability and equality for two main 
reasons.  First, they believed it recognized that achieving equality and rights is possible 
only when individuals have the means and conditions to fulfill and enjoy these rights.
134
   
Second, they believed it acknowledged the unique relationship between autonomy and 
dependency in disabled people‘s (and in all persons‘) lives.
135
  
¶58 Consequently, the ERPWD Bill was a unique mixture of rights and entitlements, of 
negative and affirmative provisions, that enabled disabled people to construct a wide 
range of legal claims.  A typical chapter in the ERPWD Bill began with declaring an 
abstract right, followed by giving a few concrete instructions about the operation of that 
right, and concluded with detailing the concrete roles and duties of the state in providing 
certain services to ensure that this right was fulfilled.  Thus, the employment chapter 
included anti-discrimination and reasonable accommodations provisions, a mechanism of 
appropriate representation for disabled people, and an additional provision that dealt with 
employment and rehabilitation programs to encourage the integration of disabled people 
into the general labor market.
136
 
¶59 The ERPWD Bill created a particularly important role for social rights and state 
obligations within the emerging rights scheme.
137
  It included provisions that addressed 
access to healthcare, grants, and personal assistance allowances in support of independent 
living; arrangements that allowed attention to each child‘s educational needs; and 
rehabilitation and vocational training programs.  Of specific interest is the ERPWD Bill‘s 
―Special Needs‖ section, which included entitlements to acquisition of impairment-
related equipment, to professional consultation for the purpose of personal decision-
making, and to mobility allowances.
138
  The role of the Special Needs section in the 
disability rights scheme was one of allowing and maximizing the utilization of rights. 
¶60 It is therefore particularly revealing that missing from the ERPWD Bill was a 
rights-based reformulation of disability allowances.  The local disability rights formula 
avoided the issue of social security, both as a measure of economic relief and as a source 
of human dignity for disabled people.  None of the Bill‘s drafts mentions a right to 
economic security, to social insurance, to social welfare, to adequate living conditions, or 
even to a minimum standard of living, to name a few possible options.
139
  In fact, this is 
                                               
133 Ziv, supra note 56, at 194–97; Herr, supra note 56. 
134 PUBLIC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 3. 
135 Ziv, supra note 56, at 201. 
136 The Employment Chapter was fully included in the 1998 law.  See ERPWD Bill, supra note 59, §§ 8–
18; see also PUBLIC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 30–41 (ERPWD Bill §10-13B) (further 
describing the ERPWD Bill); Auphir & Orenstein, supra note 60, at 63–72 (reviewing and analyzing that 
section). 
137 See Ziv, supra note 86, for a detailed review of the status of disabled people‘s social rights. 
138 Clearly, each of these provisions can be easily linked to a specific right: special equipment to healthcare 
and fostering autonomy, mobility to freedom of movement, and decision-making to liberty, human dignity, 
and privacy, or even to the particular right to make decisions that was already adopted into the ERPWDL.    
139 See infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text, for a discussion of an array of available options. 
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one of the very few issues with legal implications that were totally abandoned in the 
process of formulating disability rights.
140
  
2. Implied Distinctions Among Disability Allowances  
¶61 A close reading of the ERPWD Bill and the Public Committee Report reveals that 
while they both espouse in-kind benefits (provision of actual services), they also 
introduce an implicit distinction between two types of cash benefits (such as direct 
payments): those intended to cover specific, impairment-related needs, and those that 
concern general living expenses.  The first type relies on a link between a specific 
disability and the particular needs it generates.  These impairment-related cash benefits 
were incorporated into the rights formula.  They were justified as ―adequate services‖ and 




¶62 The second type of cash benefit is the focus of this study.  It concerns basic 
disability allowances that are intended to cover general living expenses.
142
  This basic 
allowance is based on one‘s level of disability, but is not explicitly linked to any 
particular need.  The structure, definitions, and levels of this allowance are different for 
each program, yet none of the programs provides a reference to the type of expenses the 
allowance is meant to cover.  Based on the amounts granted, it seems that disability 
allowances are meant to cover daily expenses, some of which might be related to one‘s 
impairment, but most of which are basic living expenses.  This is particularly evident in 
instances where a means test is employed. 
¶63 The inevitable conclusion is that the local disability rights scheme found no place 
for cash benefits that covered needs which were not disability-related, such as food, 
shelter, and clothing, not to mention furniture or cleaning supplies—the kind of needs 
that all people share and that advocates for poor people demand.  It seems that an implicit 
distinction between disability-related needs and poverty-related needs was at work and 
hindered the formulation of a rights-based justification for adequate disability 
allowances. 
3. The Reasons for Neglecting Disability Allowances 
¶64 The primary explanation for this neglect, as expressed by some disability 
advocates, is a tactical one.  It is based on the claim that this struggle is not to be handled 
by means of ordinary legal methods of litigation and legislation; instead, it should 
emanate from the bottom up, and as such, it should be initiated in the appropriate arena— 
                                               
140 Another issue is sexuality and family life, a growing concern particularly among parents of people with 
developmental disabilities. 
141 The community living chapter, for instance, included two such provisions.  One was the newly designed 
entitlement to personal assistance (that was to replace attendance allowance).  PUBLIC COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 58, at 59–65 (finding that institutional care is the norm under current state practice).  A second 
provision concerned state funded financial assistance for housing for those who could not otherwise afford 
housing other than institutional care.  Id. 
142  These are the more familiar disability allowances as provided by the major disability allowances 
mechanism, including the Invalids Law benefits to disabled veterans, the Work Injury Program, and the 
general disability insurance program.  See supra Part III.A.  
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that is, in the streets.
143
  While this argument presents a sufficient explanation from a 
tactical perspective, it avoids the central issue of the disability-poverty dyad.  If the issue 
were a matter of strategy and not of essence, there would have been a clear understanding 
that disability insurance constituted an integral part of disability rights.  Then the central 
struggle would have focused on prioritizing living allowances within the disability rights 
agenda.  The absence of such recognition indicates that a more critical account is needed. 
¶65 Another dominant explanation is that disability allowances were abandoned 
because they were considered part of the old world of charity and goodwill that should be 
abolished—the epitome of paternalistic and anachronistic social welfare policy that is 
based on an outdated individualist-medical approach to disability.
144
  The charity 
approach to welfare implies that disability is a static condition and that disabled people 
are destined to live on the margins of society.  It means that disabled people cannot hope 
to be equal participants in—not to mention contributors to—social, cultural, and political 
life; that they deserve handouts to keep them alive, albeit at the edge of society.  This 
view conflicts with that advanced by disability rights advocates in Israel, as well as in 
Britain and the United States, who believe in transforming disabled people into a 
flourishing community of dignified citizens.
145
  In reply, Mark Weber, a leading 
disability law scholar who studied extensively the realm of disability allowances, 




¶66 It has also been argued that social insurance was rejected because, like private 
charity, it was perceived as merely ―cosmetic,‖ a superficial social remedy that does not 
impact the social structure but rather legitimizes it, and consequently hinders the 
revolution that rights were about to bring.
147
  Within the disability rights scheme that 
evolved, disability insurance, particularly in the form of living allowances, was perceived 
as a wrong that could be tolerated only as a transitional measure, until the transformation 
would be complete.  According to this view, in due time, disability insurance would 
become irrelevant and unnecessary.
148
 
¶67 This Article suggests an additional fundamental explanation for the avoidance of 
disability allowances that has not been discussed thus far in the literature—that is, the 
attempt to distinguish between poverty and disability.  According to this explanation, the 
particular need-tailored benefits were acceptable because they were clearly disability-
related, linked to costs and services that disabled people require regardless of their actual 
                                               
143 This was the kind of reasoning that the lawyers who founded Bizchut were expressing.  See, e.g., 
Interview with Ziv, supra note 95; Interview with Auphir, supra note 95.  In an article that Ziv published 
recently, she stressed that argument more specifically, even though she also acknowledges that ―the issue of 
allowances is a direct reflection of the idea of ‗adequate services.‘‖ See Ziv, supra note 86, at 844–45. 
144 See Mark Weber, Disability Rights, Disability Discrimination and Social Insurance, 25 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 575, 599–600 (2009). 
145 The rights view of disability allowances was voiced most clearly in the 1976 Fundamental Principles 
document of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation.  See MICHAEL J. OLIVER, 
UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 21–28 (1996) (quoting and discussing this 
document); see also Anita Silvers, Formal Justice in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1998). 
146 Weber, supra note 144, at 600. 
147 See OLIVER, supra note 145, at 21–28. 
148 Weber, supra note 28, at 908–09.  Weber criticizes this view.  Id. at 909–11; see discussion supra Part 
VI. 
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economic condition.  In the eyes of rights advocates, the perceived problem with 
disability allowances, particularly in their current form as a living allowance, is that they 
establish a link between disability and poverty.  Rights advocates did not welcome this 
link because it had no place in the world they envisioned for disabled people.  In that 
world, poverty among the disabled community would not stem from the condition of 
disability, but from other reasons.
149
  The differentiation between poverty and disability, 
then, was not strategic but was instead rooted in the very assumptions of the discourse, 
according to which poverty in itself is not a disability rights issue.  Breaking the link 
between disability and poverty resulted in the constitution of a rigid separation between 
social security and disability rights as two distinct spheres.
150
 
¶68 The absence of social security from the ERPWD Bill also exposed the possibility 
that neo-liberal ideas play a prominent role in the formulation of rights-based disability 
policies.  Hence, while all of the social services enumerated and promoted in the ERPWD 
Bill were designed to enable disabled persons to lead independent lives by providing 
better conditions for their productivity—primarily through full employment—disability 
insurance was perceived (albeit indirectly) as relinquishing their hope of becoming 
productive citizens.  This implicit equation between dignity and productivity suggests 
that the disability rights framework has not been able to challenge the predominant 
meaning of productivity and independence, but rather has adopted it.   
4. Understanding Disability, Poverty, and Rights  
¶69 Analyzing the absence of social insurance from the ERPWD Bill in terms of the 
disability/poverty dyad raises the question of whether the disability rights discourse is 
still open to a classic critique of rights as fundamentally a liberal concept.
151
  Although 
sophisticated and socially oriented, disability rights seem to eventually perpetuate the 
marginalization of disabled people.  Nancy Fraser, a world-renowned political scientist, 
critiques this type of identity-based rights movements, arguing that it gives rise to the 
politics of recognition, which overshadows the politics of redistribution that preceded 
it.
152
  Fraser argues that it is typical of recognition-focused movements to ignore the 
                                               
149 Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1032–48 (1998).  Diller expresses the 
view that in the future disability will not be different from other conditions such as age and education.  Id. 
150 Absence of attention to social security was present in additional sections of the Bill.  Thus, the provision 
concerning accommodations of legal proceedings did not address proceedings before administrative 
tribunals, and the accessibility part paid no special attention to access to social welfare services (although it 
did specify a right regarding access to healthcare).  See ERPWD Bill, supra note 59, §§14–24. 
151 Note that despite my critique, I do not advocate the abandoning of rights.  Nor do I endorse them as the 
ultimate device to promote social change and dismantle power structures.  I examine rights as the particular 
paradigm and a concrete resource that was developed in a certain era and ask what it entailed and what it 
missed or neglected.  Rights in my view are a process and not an outcome, as I shall explain later, and the 
critique of rights is an important, yet not exclusive, aspect of my understanding of how they work.  See 
generally JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERESTS (1996) (providing a constitutive approach to 
rights in sociolegal studies); MICHAEL W.  MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK—PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (providing a constitutive approach to rights in sociolegal 
studies); Morton J.  Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988) (discussing how rights theories 
have helped and hurt the struggle for equality). 
152 See sources cited supra note 151. 
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¶70 In encounters with rights advocates, social welfare activists have claimed that 
rights are a utopian ideal and that current pressing issues should not be ignored in the 
name of a future revolution, even an attractive one.
154
  In an interview with Yoav Kraim, 
he said: ―Our approach to rights is evolutionary not revolutionary.‖
155
  He criticized 
Bizchut for being ―guided by ideology,‖ explaining that:  
We have no problems with [the ideology of rights] but there is a great 
distance between theory and reality, and life requires compromises so that 
people‘s happiness will not be sacrificed for that ideology . . . .  Our vision 









¶71 The central question, then, becomes: Whose responsibility is it to bear disabled 
people‘s basic costs of living and added costs of disability?  Is it the state‘s duty or the 
individual‘s obligation?  And what is the role of disability allowances in the effort to re-
allocate the burdens of disability and poverty between people and the state?  Another 
issue to consider is whether this is essentially a matter of transitional measure (―in the 
meantime‖), or whether a more fundamental challenge to the rights discourse is involved.  
These questions stand at the center of the remaining discussion.   
VI. RIGHTS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY  
A. The Necessity of Disability Allowances 
¶72 Linking disability and poverty runs the risk of perpetuating the stigma that equates 
disability with inferiority, lack of productivity, worthlessness, and passivity.  At the same 
time, attempts to separate disability from poverty have ignored the fact that in many ways 
poverty and disability are interrelated.  The purpose of this Article is to work within the 
tension between the two perspectives.  While this approach may not immediately resolve 
the conflict between the two options, it could, nevertheless, facilitate a shift in 
perspectives that would ultimately lead to a resolution.  Acknowledging this tension is the 
first step in thinking critically about disability allowances.  The second step would be to 
acknowledge their undesirable yet unavoidable character.  In other words, I suggest 
recognizing the necessity for disability allowances while at the same time striving to 
make them unnecessary and even redundant for as many disabled people as possible.   
                                               
153  See NANCY FRASER, MAPPING THE RADICAL IMAGINATION: BETWEEN REDISTRIBUTION AND 
RECOGNITION (2003); NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A 
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003). 
154 Interview with Yoav Kraim, spokesperson, Campaign for Handicapped Persons in Isr. (May 9, 2002) 
(on file with author); Yoav Kraim, spokesperson, Campaign for Handicapped Persons in Isr., Address, Tel 
Aviv Univ. (on file with author). 
155 Interview with Yoav Kraim, supra note 154.   
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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¶73 The tension between the undesirable yet unavoidable character of some legal 
measures is familiar in other realms of antidiscrimination law as well.  Affirmative action 
policies, for example, attempt to undo social wrongs while facing the risk of reinforcing 
that same wrong.  For that very reason, many understand affirmative action policies to be 
only temporary measures, even if the future in which such policies will not be necessary 
is distant.
158
  Indeed, this Article considers the possibility of viewing disability 
allowances as a form of affirmative action that compensates disabled people for the 
added costs they bear in a society that is mostly inaccessible and, as yet, unwilling to 
become fully accessible and accommodating.   
¶74 One central reason for acknowledging the necessity of disability allowances is 
undeniably rooted in the life experiences of disabled people.  Listening to disabled 
people‘s voices is an important, corrective step.  It deviates from the traditional approach, 
in which disabled people are excluded from the decision-making processes that concern 
their lives and well-being.  Nevertheless, the issue of disability allowances cannot be 
embraced unequivocally solely because disabled people demand them.  Critical listening 
means that ―voices from the bottom‖ are taken into account, but examined and judged in 
light of other principles and of a relevant historical, political, and socioeconomic 
context.
159
  Currently, there are a disproportionately large number of disabled people who 
live in poverty, making economic survival the most pressing issue in their lives.  For 
those disabled people, disability allowances are about the here and now, while disability 
rights that attempt to restructure society are perceived as a long-term goal, if not a 
utopian ideal.   
¶75 In the case of Israel, the conflict over the role of social insurance benefits did more 
than trigger a disagreement about the goals of the disability movement.  It also tested the 
movement‘s limits and inclusiveness.  Because disability rights advocates chose to ignore 
the issue of social security, the recipients of disability insurance felt alienated from and 
misrepresented by the rights discourse.  Thus, although the focus on disability rights 
contributed to processes of identity construction, group formation, and movement-
building among disabled people,
160
 it nevertheless was perceived as insufficient by some 
of its major prospective beneficiaries.  The improved status and political power that the 
disability rights movement promised its constituents made for a positive but incomplete 
framework.  Its efforts to translate disabled people‘s experiences and needs into legal 
categories fell short of addressing disabled people‘s most basic need: a dignified standard 
of living and economic security.   
¶76 For poor disabled people, the distinction between disability and poverty was 
nonexistent because their daily experiences had already taught them the many links 
between the two and the extent to which economic productivity played a role in shaping 
the relationships between them.  Yet the disability rights scheme did not acknowledge the 
centrality of disability allowances in many disabled people‘s lives and their significant 
                                               
158 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 47, 385–87 (1990).  See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE 
III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997), for a 
review of the United States‘ history of affirmative action policies and the debates that surrounded them. 
159 Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.  
REV. 323 (1987). 
160 Mor, supra note 53.  See DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND 
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003), for a detailed account of these 
processes, as appeared in the United States context. 
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contribution as a means of securing their economic survival.  These concerns were put 
aside, not because of a need to prioritize the struggle‘s goals, but rather because they 
were perceived as contradicting its goals.  The local disability rights scheme, which could 
tolerate dependencies and ―special needs‖ of various kinds, could not tolerate the 
perceived implications of demanding basic living allowances.  Similarly, the rights 
movement was unable to deliver a vision in which disability allowances would play an 
affirmative role in disabled people‘s lives. 
¶77 The demand for dignified disability allowances cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to 
the struggle of disability rights or as a matter of ―false consciousness,‖ nor should it be 
viewed as a naïve and misguided belief in the power of allowances.  A useful concept 
here would be ―double consciousness,‖ as developed by critical race theorists in reply to 
the critique of rights, which was raised by critical legal studies.
161
  According to this 
view, oppressed groups demand rights not because they are captivated by the myth of 
―rights‖ but because they consider rights a vehicle for hope, while nevertheless 
acknowledging that in the current reality, rights might mean very little.
162
  The same can 
be said about disabled people‘s demands for disability allowances as a matter of right.  
This need not suggest that disability allowances are a quick and easy repair for disabled 
people‘s impoverishment, since their everyday experiences leave no doubt that the road 
to equality is a long one.  In this view, formulating disability allowances as a matter of 
rights could indeed be an act of resistance, which, rather than representing a naïve 
approach, is in effect a call for struggle.
163
   
B. The Limits of Rights  
¶78 The disability rights discourse currently faces two main challenges.  The first 
concerns disabled people who do not yet participate in the labor force for various 
economic, social, and political reasons.  The second concerns the group of disabled 
people who will never be able to work.    
1. Disability Allowances as a Transitory Measure 
¶79 Addressing the first challenge requires resolving an apparent conflict between a 
short-term view and a long-term view.  The former focuses on present hardships that 
disabled people face, while the latter envisions a dramatically different future—a 
disability utopia that could become a reality through a rights revolution.  Instead, this 
study suggests the focus should shift to the measures that should be taken in the interim 
time period and the need to guarantee economic security until disability rights become a 
reality.  Under this view, disability allowances are perceived as a transitory measure that 
compensates disabled people for their ongoing discrimination and exclusion.  TenBroek 
and Wilson addressed the issue of disability allowances as early as 1954, arguing that 
                                               
161 Matsuda, supra note 159; see also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies 
Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  301 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). 
162 Matsuda, supra note 159.  I use double consciousness to mean that the demand for rights made by 
disadvantaged groups is more than a mere fascination with rights and an inability to comprehend their 
limited and sometimes oppressive power.  
163 Rights can also be viewed as a process.  See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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disability allowances are intended to compensate disabled people for the social barriers 




¶80 Framing disability allowances this way raises the following fundamental question: 
Who should pay the price for society‘s ableist power structure and its consequences until 
ableism is dismantled?
165
  Excluding disability allowances from the discussion implies 
that society is not required to bear the full cost for its past and ongoing ableist norms and 
practices.  It also means that until society is fully transformed, disabled people will 
remain poor.  However, as the protests and other campaigns of recent years have 
demonstrated, disabled people are no longer willing to bear a burden that belongs to 
society as a whole.  Providing dignified disability allowances means that society pays for 
the consequences of its current overt policies and hidden practices.   
¶81 Acknowledging the need for transitory measures entails an even greater challenge 
to disability rights.  The need to rely on disability allowances for survival might persist 
for a much longer time than disability rights advocates are willing to consider, much less 
admit, because it calls for the realization that society‘s transformation will be a long and 
drawn-out process that might never be fully completed, and it implies that disability 
rights are indeed a utopian ideal that will never reach full realization.
166
   
¶82 This argument relies on the lessons of additional rights struggles, which have 
proved that the vision of rights is hard to achieve and that rights do not make poverty go 
away.  Thus, both African-Americans and women have fought for their rights for many 
years, and despite major achievements still experience discrimination, exclusion, and 
high rates of poverty.  Even heralded rights victories like Brown v. Board of Education
167
 
and Roe v. Wade
168
 did not end de facto segregation or enable free access to abortion.  
Each resulted from a long and frustrating process, including ample failures and defeats.
169
  
Yet contending with poverty during an interim period poses a fundamental problem for 
disability rights advocates.  Because their goal is to eradicate poverty from disabled 
people‘s lives, any measure that acknowledges the persistence of poverty casts doubt 
upon the efficacy of their approach.  Such measures suggest that the goal of creating a 
world with no barriers for disabled people is unattainable.  More broadly, it symbolizes 
the futility of rights. 
¶83 Approaching the issue of disability allowances in terms of unavoidable yet 
undesirable necessity requires a different view of rights (and similarly of law) as a 
process rather than an outcome, a resource rather than an objective, a terrain of ongoing 
struggle rather than a promise for stability.  Rights in this view belong to the 
contradictory and conflicted dynamics of legal and social relations, as opposed to abstract 
theoretical inquiries—rights are constantly produced and reproduced by various 
                                               
164  Jacobus tenBroek & Richard P. Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance—A Normative 
Evaluation, 1 UCLA L. REV. 237 (1954); see Weber, supra note 28 (endorsing this argument). 
165 See Weber, supra note 28. 
166 Id. at 909–11; see Weber, supra note 144.   
167 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee, Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
168 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).   
169 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); 
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987). 
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contradicting forces rather than given by a higher authority, or by a law of nature.
170
  
Interestingly, disability rights advocates were willing to acknowledge that in some 
aspects, the difficulty with disability allowances and their status as a temporary measure 
was characteristic of the entire initiative of legislation for the equality of disabled people.  
Thus, Ariela Auphir and Dan Orenstein, two of the most influential figures in the 
legislative process of the ERPWDL, concluded their article with the following point:  
Indeed a paradox.  On the one hand, by enacting the ERPWDL a new age 
has begun in the annals of the struggle for equality and social justice in 
Israel.  On the other hand, Israeli society‘s greatest achievement will be 
the day that it will become obsolete.
171
 
2. The Permanent Need for Disability (or Equivalent) Allowances  
¶84 The second challenge to the effort to establish rights for the disabled concerns the 
group of disabled people who will never be able to work.  This raises an additional set of 
delicate and complicated issues for disability advocates.  One of the aims of the disability 
movement is to narrow the boundaries of the group that is considered unable to work by 
claiming that many disabled people are currently unproductive because it is society—
rather than their impairments—that limits them.  Once society mends its wrongs, a large 
portion of this unproductive group can in fact become part of the labor market.  This view 
challenges societal assumptions with regard to the ―severity‖ of one‘s disability because 
many impairments are in fact easy to accommodate.  Once there is an agreement on the 
duty of society to become fully accessible and accommodating, the question becomes 
primarily a financial issue.  However, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that there is a 
group of people, particularly those with very severe and complex disabilities, who will 
not be able to perform any form of wage-earning labor even in a society that is fully 
accessible and entirely accommodating.  This brings up the possibility that some disabled 
people are in fact expected to remain poor because of their impairments, and not for 
reasons unrelated to disability.
172
  
¶85 This group of disabled people, who are expected to remain poor, forces disability 
rights activists to recognize the role that ―mere poverty‖ still plays in their vision.  The 
question is theoretical and practical at the same time.  It calls for consideration of two 
possible mechanisms that provide support for existential needs upon which severely 
disabled people can depend: either living allowances designed specifically for disabled 
people, or general assurance-of-income allowances that cover the needs of people who 
live in poverty, including disabled people.  The inevitable conclusion is that the scheme 
of disability rights must depend on a strong social insurance mechanism that is either 
particular to disabled people or universal to all poor people.  This last issue is at the heart 
of the next chapter.   
                                               
170  See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG 
WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 145 (1990) (―Rights come to be opportunities for action, not guarantees of 
protection.‖).  Other scholars have taken similar approaches to rights.  See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 151; 
BRIGHAM, supra note 151; HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996).  
171 Auphir & Orenstein, supra note 60, at 87. 
172 See Weber, supra note 28, at 909–11. 
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VII. TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTING DISABILITY ALLOWANCES  
¶86 In order to consider the options suggested in the previous Part, 173  and to re-
conceptualize disability allowances as a matter of rights, it is necessary to examine what 
services these allowances are supposed to cover.  This Part presents three possible models 
of general disability allowances.  First, the traditional way to understand general 
disability allowances is as a sub-type of welfare payments (such as public assistance), a 
minimal safety net that intends to cover basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothing.  
Second, a more critical way of understanding disability allowances, which is presented 
here, is as a new form of benefit that is designed to cover unspecified disability-related 
costs that stem from society‘s continuing exclusionary institutions and practices.  The 
third model integrates the first two by incorporating both basic needs and additional extra 
costs.   
¶87 The understanding of disability allowances as merely a minimal safety net that 
covers poverty-related basic needs carries the risk of perpetuating the marginality of 
disabled people and legitimizing the ableist power structure.  This is because basic needs 
allowances are practically destined to have need as their guiding allocating principle, and 
thus to perpetuate disabled people‘s poverty and inferiority.
174
  Such structure is most 
likely to reproduce the power relations to which disabled people are currently subjected, 
even in a generous system, as long as it manifests a view of disability rooted in the 
individual, while ignoring society‘s role in generating indigence and disablement.  
Benefits for disabled veterans provide a good example.  Their relative generosity is 
usually related to society‘s acknowledgement of its own direct and explicit role in 
disabling the soldiers by sending them to military service.  However, their underlying 
compensation principle overlooks society‘s ongoing role as a disabling structure, 
manifested in its inaccessibility to disabled people, and in the socio-cultural 
understanding that equates disability with inferiority.
175
  
¶88 The alternative understanding of disability allowances, which is promoted here, 
contends that disability allowances should be viewed as society‘s obligation to pay for its 
role as an ableist structure; a payment that must continue until the last of the social 
barriers disappears.  It perceives the extra costs of disability as a matter of social 
responsibility for redressing past wrongs and not the individual‘s burden.
176
  This 
understanding meets the two major lessons of the analysis thus far: it acknowledges the 
necessity of disability allowances, and it avoids perpetuating the marginalization of 
disabled people.   
¶89 A somewhat similar rationale was developed by the Campaign for the 
Handicapped, which, as mentioned earlier, promoted a view of allowances as rights that 
aim to bridge the gap between the cost of living of a disabled person and those of a 
nondisabled person.
177
  The Campaign for the Handicapped‘s memorandum argued that 
―disability allowances are an investment that allow the disabled to secure [their] unique 
                                               
173 See supra Part VI. 
174 Silvers, supra note 145, at 17. 
175 Between Charity, Welfare and Warfare, supra note 10. Another pitfall of this model is that it is highly 
unlikely to change the hierarchy of benefits among the various groups of disabled people.  See id. 
176 See Zaidi & Burchardt, supra note 18 (providing a recent survey of the extra costs of disability). 
177 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
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needs, to integrate into the country‘s life and contribute to it.‖
178
  This concept has also 
been developed with great elaboration by the Disability Income Group (DIG), a British 
organization of disabled people that, since its establishment in 1966, has been 
campaigning for the acknowledgement of the extra costs that disabled people accrue in 
their daily lives.
179
  This view was also supported by Professor Mark Weber, who 
suggested that disability allowances should be understood mostly as a measure of shifting 
the cost of disability from disabled people to society.
180
 
¶90 Both the Campaign for the Handicapped and DIG have asserted that the gap 
between the cost of living of a disabled and a nondisabled person (and therefore the level 
of allowance) is dynamic and depends on the level of services provided by the state.  
Both have also viewed the state as responsible for providing appropriate care and 
treatment for every person.  However, what they have both missed is a further elaboration 
of the role of the state in creating the current social, cultural, and political barriers, and a 
detailed explanation of the ways in which forms of discrimination and exclusion continue 
to contribute to this gap.
181
  
¶91 This Article calls for a reformulation of disability allowances as society‘s debt to 
disabled people for its failure to supply full access, equal rights and opportunities, and 
economic security.  A new justification for disability allowances should therefore include 
two modular layers.  First, acknowledgement of the social, dynamic, and interactive 
nature of disability.  Second, the shifting of the costs of disability to society, which is 
accountable for denying services and for not eliminating all forms of discrimination and 
exclusion of disabled people.  This new rationale justifies the subsequent demand that 
any disabled person, whether working or not, rich or poor, is entitled to disability 
allowances as coverage for additional costs imposed upon disabled people in comparison 
to non-disabled people, not as a substitute for wages.   
¶92 Another advantage of the justification for disability allowances promoted here is 
that once the ableistic rationale that underlies disability benefit programs is exposed, no 
disability program can escape the consequences.  Thus, in contrast to the current situation 
in Israel—whereby veterans receive more substantial benefits than other disabled 
people—this new logic might provide disabled veterans with lower levels of disability 
allowances than other disabled persons, because they enjoy services that are more 
comprehensive.  However, under the new formulation, the allowances would be allocated 
to compensate not for the inferiority that is associated with disability, but rather for 
society‘s role in allowing the persistent social, cultural, and political disablements that 
transform disabled people into inferior citizens.  This is therefore a universal model for 
disability benefits, based on a social construction model of disability, which takes the 
consequences of ableism seriously and connects all disabled people and disability benefit 
programs under one umbrella.   
                                               
178 Memorandum from the Campaign for Handicapped Persons in Isr., supra note 120.  
179 DISABILITY INCOME GRP., DIG‘s NATIONAL DISABILITY INCOME: A POLICY STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE 
DISABILITY INCOME GROUP (1987), http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/disablement%20income%20group/dig.pdf. See OLIVER, supra note 145, at Chapter 2, for 
a discussion of DIG‘s role in the history of the British disability movement.  
180 Weber, supra note 144, at 597–98; Weber, supra note 28. 
181 That was the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation‘s (UPIAS) criticism of DIG and the 
main reason for the split among the groups.  See OLIVER, supra note 145, at Chapter 2. 
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¶93 The third and final model of disability allowances covers both basic needs and 
nonspecific disability-related costs.  Such a formulation is more comprehensive than the 
second model, as it also addresses the needs of disabled people who cannot work at all.  It 
expresses an understanding that even in a world of complete and dignified services, and 
of no discrimination, marginalization, isolation, or any other form of oppression, there 
would still be a small group of disabled people without the means to cover daily living 
expenses.   
¶94 Disability advocates are likely to agree on the extra costs of the disability 
component and on its justification, but it is less likely that they will agree on the basic 
needs component in disability allowances.  It seems that there are three available options 
with regard to the basic needs component: first, to avoid the issue of living allowances as 
unrelated to disability, an option that might alienate a substantial group of disabled 
people; second, to promote dignified living allowances solely for disabled people, a path 
that acknowledges the linkage between disability and poverty, although it separates the 
disabled from the poor; and third, to join or form an alliance of all people who live in 
poverty, which would promote dignified living allowances for all.  The next Part will 
discuss the implications of the dilemma that the choice between options two and three 
involves. 
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTIVISM AND COALITION BUILDING  
¶95 It is evident that the disability-poverty predicament evokes not only issues related 
to intra-group relations and tensions, but also to conflicts and challenges related to inter-
group relations and coalition building possibilities.
182
  Separating disability from poverty 
generates identity group politics, which encourages disabled people to find what unites 
them as a group and what distinguishes them from others.  It allows disabled people to 
distance themselves from pity, misery, and indigence, and instead dedicate their efforts to 
fostering activism in the realms of disability pride, identity, and culture.  Yet this 
direction contributes to the creation of more rigid boundaries between disabled people 
and other social groups.  As Nancy Fraser explained, such inward group-based politics is 
part of a ―politics of recognition‖ climate, in which identity-based social movements 
distance themselves from the politics of distribution.
183
  The immediate result of such 
inward group-based politics is the prevention of a unified front with other social groups 
in the fight against poverty as well as in other struggles.  Finally, such politics might 
contribute to an even greater denial of poverty as a continuing concern for disability 
activism. 
¶96 Conversely, the linking of disability and poverty through intra-group politics 
obscures the boundaries between disadvantaged social groups, thus allowing for a greater 
accumulation of power through alliances and coalition building.
184
  This is needed not 
only because, as the Marxist-Socialist argument goes, the most fundamental power 
structure in society is that between capital owners and the capital-less proletariat.  Nor is 
it motivated by the fact that all disadvantaged groups are disproportionately poor.  
                                               
182 These concerns seem to be beyond the scope of this Article, but they cannot be totally ignored. 
183 FRASER, supra note 153; FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 153. 
184 Ravi Malhotra, The Politics of the Disability Rights Movement, 7(3) NEW POLITICS 65 (2001). 





 analysis shows, intra-group alliances are essential primarily 
because the intersections among the various identity axes allow the inclusion of a variety 
of social categories, including gender, race, and ethnicity, all of which are also inexorably 
constitutive of and constituted by poverty.
186
 
¶97 The issue of coalition-building with other groups in the realm of disability 
allowances is particularly challenging.  It requires comparing the forms of poverty that 
disabled people experience with those typical of other groups.  It also questions the 
implicit meaning of a struggle for dignified disability allowances: Are disabled people the 
only group that deserves to live above the poverty line, while the other poor remain 
below?  This latter concern returns full circle to the critique of the invention of disability 
allowances as a policy that creates a distinction between the deserving and the non-
deserving poor.  Yet to question the origins of this distinction is to question the need for 
disability allowances altogether. 
¶98 This Article has attempted to develop a justification and rationale for disability 
allowances as opposed to a view that opposes, or denies, the need for them altogether.  
The goal of the discussion here is slightly different: to develop a justification for 
maintaining (or not) the divide between disabled people and poor people, between 
disability allowances and general welfare payments.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
it will again be useful to distinguish between the basic needs and the added costs 
components of disability allowances.  The added costs component could be easily 
justified by the different living expenses that disabled people must bear, due not only to 
their particular impairment but also to the discrimination and exclusion imposed on them 
by society, which is largely inaccessible and not accommodated for the needs of disabled 
people.  The basic needs component, however, poses a stronger challenge to disability 
activists.  It raises the questions of whether it is possible to address only the needs of 
disabled poor people, or whether it is necessary to address people who live in poverty as 
well. 
¶99 A fully consistent view might lead one to conclude that if disability and poverty are 
interrelated, it would be impossible to construct separate social welfare mechanisms to 
address the implications of each.  Moreover, a true commitment to social solidarity must 
assume that every person, not only disabled people, deserves to live with human dignity 
and economic security.  Similarly, a comprehensive view of social welfare dynamics 
mandates a link between all persons who require basic living allowances for their 
physical survival, disabled or not.  Promoting dignified living allowances only for 
disabled people strengthens intra-group bonds, but it also carries the risk of conveying a 
message that disabled people are more deserving of those allowances. 
¶100 On the other hand, strengthening inter-group relations might come at the price of 
the power of inner group ties and possibly hinder the development of disability culture 
and pride.  The alternative suggested here is to join—or better yet, form a strategic 
alliance with—other disadvantaged groups to promote dignified living allowances for all.  
                                               
185  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991), for further elaboration on intersectionality.  
Crenshaw classifies for analysis and considers multiple axes of identity that characterizes every person, 
particularly along gender and race lines.  Id. 
186 Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 22 (arguing that disability and illness are distributed in ways that 
reflect gender, racial, and economic inequalities). 
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This work of coalition-building does not require merging the various groups together and 
therefore should not lead to losing each group‘s power and relevance.  It rather requires 
an effort that takes seriously both the politics of recognition and the politics of 
distribution.   
IX. CONCLUSION  
¶101 Whether one finds disability allowances a favorable reality or a terrible 
compromise, they appear to be ever present in the context of disability policy.  As a 
result, it is important to find a suitable justification and proper structure to respond to the 
various critiques that disability allowances face. 
¶102 The concept of disability allowances envisioned here does not assume that 
establishing disability allowances is an end unto itself, nor that it would constitute the 
ultimate solution to the problems of marginalization and exclusion of disabled people.  
Nor is it assumed that conceptualizing disability allowances as a right would ensure that 
they remain a firm and secure social structure.
187
  Following the theoretical framework of 
disability legal studies, however, I do think that understanding the dis/ability power 
system entails acknowledging the necessity of disability allowances.  The recognition that 
disability allowances are essential goes hand in hand with the aspiration that there will 
come a day when they will no longer be necessary, at least not in the lives of so many 
disabled people. 
¶103 If disability allowances are indeed affirmed, there are various resources available 
for establishing the fundamental right to disability allowances.  One approach would be 
to structure it as a right to social security.  Thus, for example, Article 22 of the 1948 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares, ―Everyone, as a 
member of society, has the right to social security.‖
188
  In addition, Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights provides that the ―States 
Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance.‖
189
  More recently, the United Nations adopted the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  Article 28 of the Convention says, 
―States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of 
living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing 
. . . .‖
190
 
¶104 Another possible approach would be to base this demand on a substantive right to 
welfare, an attempt that was unsuccessful in the United States.
191
  Because of the related 
hierarchy between social security and welfare, a welfare right is of a lower status than the 
right to social security.  The most advanced vision for disability allowances would be 
social insurance because it entails higher principles of social responsibility, economic 
                                               
187 I also do not suggest that rights are the best solution to disabled people‘s social hardships and suffering, 
or the most effective form of resistance.  I take rights as the current comprehensive legal language with 
which to address the marginalization and exclusion of disabled people. 
188 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 22, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A. U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
189 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added). 
190 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. A/61/6111 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
191 See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the welfare rights movement in the 
United States. 
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security, and dignified standards of living.  These are not the only options available, of 
course, but mere examples.  My goal here is to show that tools and precedents for 
articulating such a right already exist.  The choice between them may depend on 
ideological preferences, local legacies, and political strategies. 
¶105 As this study comes to an end, it might be mistakenly viewed as arguing that 
disability allowances are the single most important issue for disabled people in their 
struggle for equality, dignity, and economic security.  Although important, disability 
allowances cannot be examined in isolation.  Indeed, the view promoted here is that 
disability allowances should be part of a larger quest for justice, and disability rights are 
currently the major vehicle through which to achieve it.  Clearly, disability allowances 
cannot be the only issue on the agenda of disabled people; ignoring them altogether, 
however, is both impossible and wrong.  Disability allowances receive the place that they 
deserve only when they are positioned within a comprehensive view of dismantling 
ableism.  Without such a comprehensive plan, the constructive component of disability 
allowances is lost, and only the reinforcement of disability allowances as a form of 
subjection remains. 
 
